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ABSTRACT 
Deterrence was quickly dismissed as a possible counterterrorism (CT) strategy 
after 9/11. With temporal distance from the impact, however, the concept has 
been given a fresh, in-depth look. The encouraging results brought the policy 
back to national security strategy, but today deterrence of asymmetrical threats 
remains largely intractable. 
Use of deterrence strategy, beyond the common notion of Cold War 
deterrence, holds promise for sustainable U.S. CT policy. The implications for 
U.S. foreign policy of such strategic enactments are likely more satisfactory than 
those employed in the first decade of the war on terror. 
This thesis seeks to explore the possibility of tailored deterrence toward 
the threat from radical Islamic terrorists, by gauging what is known about the 
strategy against what is known of the adversary, and determining the most 
effective path forward.  
 v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vi 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1 
A. PROBLEM SPACE .............................................................................. 1 
B. HYPOTHESIS ...................................................................................... 2 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................ 2 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION ...................................................................... 2 
E. RESEARCH METHOD ......................................................................... 3 
F. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH ......................................................... 5 
G. THESIS ORGANIZATION .................................................................... 5 
II. PROBLEM AND INQUIRY .............................................................................. 7 
A. TERRORIST THREAT ......................................................................... 7 
1. Continued Threat ..................................................................... 7 
2. Lowering the Guard ................................................................. 9 
3. Long War ................................................................................ 11 
4. Summary of Rationale for Focus on Radical Islamic 
Terrorism ................................................................................ 12 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................... 13 
1. What is Deterrence? .............................................................. 13 
a. Historical ...................................................................... 16 
b. Cold War ...................................................................... 17 
c. Methods of Deterrence ............................................... 18 
2. Deterrence of Terrorism ........................................................ 23 
a. Deterrence Methods for Non-state Adversaries ....... 23 
b. Tailoring Deterrence for Terrorist Actors ................. 25 
c. Communicating and Credibility of Deterrence 
Threat ........................................................................... 25 
d. Significance of Deterrence Strategy to 
Counterterrorism......................................................... 26 
e. Other Factors .............................................................. 27 
3. Role of Deterrence in Post-9/11 National Strategies .......... 28 
a. Early: 2001–2004 ......................................................... 29 
b. Middle: 2005–2008....................................................... 33 
c. Late: 2009–2012 .......................................................... 38 
C. THE CASE FOR DETERRENCE IN THE ASYMMETRICAL 
THREAT ENVIRONMENT ................................................................. 44 
1. Sustainable/Economical........................................................ 45 
2. Clean/Proportionate .............................................................. 46 
III. DATA ............................................................................................................ 47 
A. PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM ...................................................... 47 
1. Who Are They? ...................................................................... 48 
a. Staircases to Terrorism .............................................. 49 
b. Justice .......................................................................... 50 
 viii 
c. Religiosity .................................................................... 50 
d. Shame .......................................................................... 51 
e. Relative Deprivation.................................................... 52 
f. Group Association ...................................................... 53 
g. Displaced Anger/Projection ....................................... 54 
h. Repression/Self-Repression ...................................... 55 
2. What Do They Want? ............................................................. 56 
a. Desire for Success ...................................................... 58 
b. Messaging ................................................................... 58 
3. Role in/Relation to Organization .......................................... 59 
4. A Deterrence Framework ...................................................... 62 
a. Deterrence Spectrum .................................................. 63 
b. Summary of Violent Islamic Extremist General 
Profiles ......................................................................... 66 
B. CONFLICTS FOR COMPARISON ..................................................... 67 
1. WWII, Cold War ...................................................................... 67 
2. Israel and U.K. Experiences .................................................. 69 
3. Contemporary Terrorism Deterrence Examples ................. 71 
4. 9/11, Madrid, London, Pre-9/11 ............................................. 73 
5. Other Examples: Crime, Gangs, Graffiti .............................. 77 
a. Recruiting .................................................................... 78 
b. Lessons of Graffiti ...................................................... 79 
c. Summary of Conflicts for Comparison ..................... 79 
C. APPLIED TYPOLOGIES OF DETERRENCE .................................... 80 
1. Deterrence by Punishment ................................................... 80 
a. Economic Punishment ............................................... 80 
b. Punishing Suicide Bombers ...................................... 81 
2. Deterrence by Denial ............................................................. 81 
a. Threat to Success ....................................................... 83 
b. Psychological Deterrence .......................................... 84 
3. Tailored Deterrence ............................................................... 86 
4. Scope of Terror ...................................................................... 87 
5. Summary of Data ................................................................... 88 
IV. ANALYSIS .................................................................................................... 89 
A. DETERRENCE CHOICE VS. INDIVIDUAL ACTOR MATRIX ........... 89 
B. ANALYSIS OF MATRIX ..................................................................... 90 
C. ADDITIONAL MATRICES FOR CONSIDERATION .......................... 92 
1. Internal vs. External Act/Threat ............................................ 92 
2. Internal vs. External Actor(s) ................................................ 93 
3. Type of Attack/Plot ................................................................ 94 
D. TESTING AND ANALYZING ............................................................. 95 
E. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS ................................................................. 96 
V. STRATEGIES: UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND OFFSETS ............... 99 
A. DISRUPTION HARNESSED BY “THE FEW” ................................. 100 
1. 9/11: Disruptive Innovation ................................................. 101 
 ix 
2. Complex Adaptive Systems ................................................ 103 
B. COUNTER-STRATEGIES FOR SYSTEMS ..................................... 104 
C. MODERN TERRORISM AS DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY ............ 106 
D. STRATEGIZING BEYOND TECHNOLOGY .................................... 109 
1. A Deterrence Strategy ......................................................... 111 
E. DETERRENCE AS INNOVATION ................................................... 112 
VI. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS ............................... 115 
A. FINDINGS ........................................................................................ 115 
B. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................... 116 
C. IMPLEMENTATION ......................................................................... 118 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................... 118 
LIST OF REFERENCES ........................................................................................ 121 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................................................................... 129 
 
 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Roles and Types within Terrorist Hierarchies ..................................... 61 
Figure 2. Davis and Jenkins’s list of deterrence measures in the war on terror . 63 
 
 xi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xii 
LIST OF TABLES 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiv 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AQAP  al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
 
COA course of action 
CT counterterrorism 
 
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DO JOC  Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept 
DOD Department of Defense 
 
HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
 
IDA Institute for Defense Analysis 
IRA Irish Republican Army 
 
NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
NSA  non-state actors 
 
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 
QHSR Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
 
START National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism 
 
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 xv 
 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xvi 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The application of a tailored deterrence policy towards various actors in terrorist 
networks, as well as individuals along the path of the “lone wolf” is explored in 
the master’s thesis, “Applying Deterrence Strategy to Agents of Asymmetrical 
Threats.” The thesis works off the premises that the United States faces a 
protracted threat, particularly from radical Islamic terrorists, on a temporal scale 
similar to that of the Cold War, that “a sustainable, economical, clean, 
proportionate, and reasonable response to the threat” is in the best interest of the 
nation, and that although deterrence was a principal sustaining factor in the 
gradual ending of the Cold War, it was initially dismissed as a possibility in the 
war on terror as inapplicable. Based on a review of the work of subject matter 
experts and of national strategies in the post-9/11 decade, however, indications 
point to the notion that the use of deterrence toward counterterrorism is gaining 
momentum. 
Using a policy analysis based on Bardach’s “Eightfold Path,” the thesis 
seeks answer the research question, “How can the United States make better 
use of deterrence strategies in ongoing counterterrorism efforts?” The policy 
analysis falls out of an appreciative inquiry into deterrence, counterterrorism, and 
other applicable strategies. Furthermore, the understanding that deterrence can 
be constructed in many shades off more than one basic form (denial, 
punishment) with innumerable applications is central to the argument, as is the 
need for clear communication of any chosen form, and the importance of 
credibility of the deferrer towards efficacy.  
What is learned is that although a typical early (post-9/11) view of 
terrorists portrayed them as devoid of things “held dear,” which makes them 
undeterrable, by using the in-depth knowledge of adversaries that has been 
gained, and understanding the psychology of what motivates the actors, and 
what they may hope to gain in attacking, the use of tailored deterrence may be 
promising, if it is found politically palatable. Policymakers may shy away from 
 xvii 
such a strategy, which is difficult to test or analyze. However, if designed and 
implemented with reverence for American values, and held to strict standards to 
ensure credibility, such is as done with refusing to negotiate with terrorists, 
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A. PROBLEM SPACE 
Despite the desire by some to write al Qaeda’s obituary and the general 
weariness from a decade of ratcheted defenses and protracted offensives, the 
United States continues to be threatened by transnational terrorism. Security and 
terror experts and our federal government tell us that the “preeminent security 
threat to the United States continues to be from al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and 
adherents.”1 Yet at the cost of our liberties, reputation, national treasure, military 
personnel and security contractors, and serenity, the first post-9/11 decade has 
taught us that we need a sustainable, economical, clean, proportionate, and 
reasonable response to the threat, which at this point, presents as indefinite. 
The United States has already faced a sustained threat, which held the 
promise of even greater nightmares than are now posed by radical Islamic 
terrorists. For nearly 50 years, a Cold War with the USSR offered a similar kind 
of tense and tentative peace on our soil as has been lived in the past 10 years. 
Soviet cruise missiles were held at bay for all that time through the predominantly 
psychological construct of deterrence.  
Although our government leaders, as well as the great majority of 
strategists, quickly dismissed the prospect of deterring what was seen as an 
irrational enemy with no “return address” and nothing held dear following the 
September 11 attacks, the ensuing years offered a second (and third…) look at 
the prospect. As rational actors with specific agendas, terrorists make 
cost/benefit analyses of their planned actions, as do any rational military leaders 
or members of ordered societies.  
Many experts believe that by tailoring deterrence to specific parts of 
terrorist systems, the strategy can and should be an important part of 
1 White House Office, National Strategy for Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: The White 
House, 2011), 3. 
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counterterrorism (CT) and national security policy going forward. Despite this 
call, national strategies have been slow to reflect this initiative. 
B. HYPOTHESIS 
Deterrence strategy as an element of CT policy should be as specific and 
overt as possible/practical in order to be effective. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Deterrence is both understood on the interpersonal (child rearing, 
relationships) and municipal (crime) levels, as well as at the state (security) level. 
The strategy long predates the Cold War, but is best understood through the 
Cold War model. This leads many to an incomplete comprehension or 
misunderstanding of the term. In order to apply the long history and nuances of 
what is generally a simple concept properly, a review of the uses and types of 
deterrence is worthwhile. The review of scholarly and policy writing for this thesis 
will consist of three major related parts.  
To begin, a summary of the concept of deterrence will offer a solid basis 
for all the remaining discussion in this paper, as deterrence is the foundation of 
the thesis. This necessarily includes an appreciative inquiry of Cold War 
deterrence. Next, the specific literature on deterrence of terrorism will be 
analyzed in a comparative context. Finally, an extensive review of the place of 
terrorism deterrence in national strategies since 9/11 will be helpful in revealing 
both the background thinking on the topic—and specifically, how it has evolved in 
a short time—and the often, but not always corresponding place of deterrence, 
as a strategy in the service of counterterrorism. This will be especially useful in 
working toward the following research question posed and toward the policy 
analysis as the methodology used. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can the United States make better use of deterrence strategies in 
ongoing CT efforts? 
 2 
To support exploration of this primary question, it may be worthwhile to 
bear in mind some supporting notions, which generally arise out of this inquiry. 
These distinctions will become clear in the presentation of the literature review 
and factor into the conclusions of this paper. 
Questions to facilitate inquiry into primary question: 
• Is the United States using deterrence strategy in CT? To what 
degree? 
• Are deterrence policies overt or de facto? 
• Is there an important distinction in deterrence strategy and other 
strategies that might fall under the deterrence umbrella? 
• Can the costs of deterrence strategy be measured? Cost/benefit? 
• Is it more effective to have general deterrence policies or tailored? 
• Does the measure of potential death, destruction, disruption get 
calculated into the scale of the deterrence chosen? 
E. RESEARCH METHOD 
The research method to be used to answer the primary research question 
posed will be a policy analysis based on Bardach’s2 Eightfold Path.3 For step 
one, defining the problem, Bardach urges readers to think in terms of deficits and 
excess.4 As it applies here, this will be established by first determining what role 
deterrence plays in national security strategy; Section B.3. of the Literature 
Review examines the (degree of) inclusion of deterrence strategy in recent 
national policy. Held against an indefinite threat posed by radical Islamic 
terrorism, the problem (too little?) is then established.  
With this background, evidence will be further assembled using national 
strategies for counterterrorism, and security and homeland security as related to 
2 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide to Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2005). 
3 1. Define the Problem 2. Assemble Some Evidence 3. Construct Alternatives 4. Select the 
Criteria 5. Project the Outcomes 6. Confront Trade-offs 7. Decide 8. Tell Your Story 
4 Bardach, A Practical Guide to Policy Analysis, 5. 
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transnational terrorism, and then gauged using an appreciative inquiry5 of Cold 
War, post-9/11, and other related deterrence methods as part of the data set. 
Additionally, known organizational and psychological factors of al Qaeda-brand 
terrorism will comprise data that will be analyzed in a matrix that will weigh 
likelihood of success of various measures of deterrence. Using this analysis, the 
efficacy of tailored deterrence will be evaluated against standing policy, and 
recommendations made accordingly. 
Additional evidence gathering involves an assessment of what influences 
terrorists to act by reviewing and coalescing what is known about the psychology 
of terrorism. This will be a two-part undertaking; the first regarding the what 
motivates terrorists (specifically radical Islamists) and the second summarizing 
the understanding in what is hoped to be derived from committing acts of 
terrorism.  
Furthermore, data will be collected on the individual actors and support 
individuals in the organizational structure of radical Islamic terror groups. 
Toward constructing alternatives, the focus on methods of deterrence and 
evaluation of the success or futility of each based on the compiled data on the 
psychology of terrorists and terrorism, roles within terror organizations, and 
methods of deterrence offers several options. This will allow for an initial analysis 
on how best to formulate a deterrence strategy that might be effective. 
Understanding what is important to individuals who have chosen the terrorist 
path is crucial in determining the strategy. 
The analysis of the data will be derived from a matrix constructed for this 
thesis. The axes will consist on one plane of role in organization, such as 
financier, leader, or suicide bomber, and on the other plane, type of deterrent. 
5 Appreciative inquiry focuses on what works well toward finding a solution, as opposed to 
problem solving which puts emphasis on what is wrong. For more see “Definitions of Appreciative 
Inquiry,” Case Western Reserve University, July 2005, http://appreciativeinquiry.case.edu/intro/ 
definition.cfm. 
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These comprise the selected criteria for evaluation. The analysis that follows will 
offer possible outcomes as well as counter-arguments. 
F. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The review of the literature demonstrates an increasing call for the use of 
deterrence policy in the service of CT efforts. Although there was some 
significant effort at formulation and implementation in the mid to late post-9/11 
decade, the effort has not garnered any notable traction. This thesis is a small 
attempt to determine the most effective and logical way to formulate tailored 
deterrence strategy for the threat of radical Islamic terrorism. Success in this 
area would provide economic and security benefits to the United States, and may 
serve to model related strategies and policies. 
G. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Between this introductory chapter and the conclusion are four major 
sections of the thesis. The first (Chapter II) examines the problem with a review 
of the literature as discussed above, looking at general and historical deterrence, 
the place of deterrence in post-9/11 national strategies, and specific application 
of deterrence to terrorism. Chapter III presents the data to be analyzed in 
Chapter IV. The major divisions of the data chapter are Psychology of (radical 
Islamic) Terrorism, Conflicts for Comparison, and Applied Typologies of 
Deterrence. The analysis in the ensuing chapter is built off a matrix constructed 
for this study. Finally, Chapter V takes a look at the strategy surrounding the 
issues of deterrence and radical Islamic terrorism. 
 5 
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II. PROBLEM AND INQUIRY 
A. TERRORIST THREAT 
As the significance of research points to the potential value of tailored 
deterrence strategy for the threat of radical Islamic terrorism as a potential policy 
application, this section quickly reviews and establishes a need based on the 
pervasive threat. 
1. Continued Threat 
The more time that passes without an attack on American soil, the 
more this threat will test the commitment of American leaders and 
the nation’s collective patience.6 
Doubts about the threat of transnational terrorism are beginning to creep 
back into the American psyche. A Pew Research poll conducted in January 2012 
determined that Americans believe that defense of terrorism should be a “top 
priority” for Congress and the President, yet is, “given less priority today than 
over the course of the past decade.”7 In fact, the steady decline has put terrorism 
on par with social security as a concern.8 
Given this sentiment among the American public, might this view be 
reflective of professionals actually engaged in homeland security? One of the 
primary conclusions drawn by a group of homeland security professionals in 
wrapping up a rigorous and extensive program in homeland security recently was 
6 Kristin M. Lord, John A. Nagl, and Seth D. Rosen, “Beyond Bullets: A Pragmatic Strategy to 
Combat Violent Islamic Extremism,” Solarium Strategy Series, Center for a New American 
Security, June 2009, 10. 
7 “Public Priorities: Deficit Rising, Terrorism Slipping, Tough Stance on Iran Endorsed, 





                                            
that we are probably over-emphasizing this terrorism thing.9 This would indicate 
a view that it is time to move on, shift focus, or at least scale back.  
Yet, one of the things that was learned in the recovery of Osama bin 
Laden’s (OBL’s) letters in the execution of his demise—the small portion that 
were declassified and released—was that the influential leader was still quite 
focused on attacking and bringing down the United States of America.10 This has 
done little to alter the perception of the terrorist threat, even among those 
engaged in the homeland security enterprise; however, as bin Laden was viewed 
as marginalized by the time of his eventual death.11  
Perhaps these doubts are reflective of the sometimes ambiguous or 
ambivalent messages offered by terrorism experts, “Nearly 11 years after 9/11, 
there is still a remarkable lack of consensus among analysts about the current 
threat posed by al Qaeda and, in particular, about whether al Qaeda is near 
defeat or remains a significant threat.”12 The 2011 National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism is unambiguous, however: 
The preeminent security threat to the United States continues to be 
from al-Qa’ida13 and its affiliates and adherents.14 
9 Author’s personal observation, CHDS 1101/02 Capstone course. Additionally, the waning 
support from many participants’ home agencies toward the program indicates declining 
investment into the homeland security architecture; another indicator of threat perception. 
10 Nelly Lahoud et al., “Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?” Harmony Program, 
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, May 3, 2012, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/CTC_LtrsFromAbottabad_WEB_v2.pdf. 
11 Note the subtitle of “Letters from Abbottabad” is in the form of a question: “Bin Ladin 
Sidelined?” Additionally, a Pew Research poll determined that bin Laden’s death received more 
coverage than the American public had interest in. “Death of bin Laden: More Coverage than 
Interest, Many Say Osama Story Overcovered, Overview,” PewResearch Center for the People & 
Press, May 11, 2011, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1990/news-interest-osama-bin-laden-death-
overcovered. 
12 Brian Michael Jenkins, New Challenges to U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts: An Assessment 
of the Current Terrorist Threat, U.S. Senate, 1 (July 11, 2012) (Testimony before the Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs). 
13 Note that variations on spellings of Muslim names are a function of carrying quoted 
passages exactly as written. 
14 White House Office, National Strategy for Counterterrorism, 3. 
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The confusion and substantial debate centers on whether al Qaeda 
central is close to eradication. For the purposes of this paper, this is a moot point. 
The ideology, goals and strategies introduced to the world by al Qaeda live on. 
“This ideology is the lifeblood that continues to sustain the vitality and growth of 
the global jihadist movement.”15 In addition, according to Steven Flynn, “even if 
al Qaeda disappeared tomorrow, acts of terrorism…will be the asymmetric 
weapons of choice for state and nonstate actors intent on confronting U.S. power 
in the 21st century.”16 
Also for the purposes of this paper, the terms al Qaeda and violent Islamic 
extremism are used interchangeably. This is a reflection of the pervasiveness of 
the al Qaeda brand, which is based, as everyone knows, on a perversion of 
Islam. Frank Cilluffo cites a “witch’s brew” of jihadists who “may be more 
regionally or locally focused,” but “increasingly ascribe and subscribe to al 
Qaeda’s goals and the broader global jihad, with U.S. and western targets 
increasingly in their crosshairs.”17 
2. Lowering the Guard 
The 9/11 attacks redefined plausibility. Scenarios previously 
dismissed as far-fetched became operative presumptions.18 
The uncertainties about the threat from terrorism were also experienced 
prior to 9/11, as part of that world that we used to live in—one that no longer 
exists. The World Trade Center was bombed in 1993 by radical Islamic terrorists 
in the hope of bringing down the two towers in a grandiose blow to the Great 
15 Frank J. Cilluffo, “The Future of Homeland Security: Evolving and Emerging Threats,” 2, 
(Statement for a hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs) July 11, 2012, http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/the-future-of-homeland-security-
evolving-and-emerging-threats.  
16 Stephen E. Flynn, “The Future of Homeland Security: Evolving and Emerging Threats,” 
July 11, 2012, http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/the-future-of-homeland-security-evolving-
and-emerging-threats.  
17 Cilluffo, “The Future of Homeland Security: Evolving and Emerging Threats.”  
18 Brian Michael Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening 
Ourselves (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 1, http://www.rand.org/pubs/ 
monographs/MG454. 
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Satan. Though the attack killed several people and caused extensive physical, 
economic, and psychological damage, it was a failure in relation to its goals. 
Security, which was not yet called homeland security, was quickly ratcheted up, 
sustained, and then gradually relaxed to an intermediary level. Then came the 
bombing of the Khobar Towers in 1996 by radical Islamic terrorists, in which 19 
American servicemen were killed, and then I998 African embassy bombings. 
Although these attacks occurred in the far reaches of other continents, they were 
recognized as attacks against American interests, and security at home was 
again successively ratcheted up and then gradually relaxed. The pattern 
repeated with the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000. The time may have come to 
lower the guard again by September of the following year. 
Al Qaeda has already proven the virtue of being patient. If the absence of 
a successfully orchestrated transnational terrorist attack on U.S. soil in the ten 
years since the Pearl Harbor of our time is evidence of anything, it may be just 
that. It may also indicate that the monumental CT efforts that have been 
unleashed since the attacks are having the effect that we are paying for. Rather 
than look at this as a return on investment, albeit a costly one, some may choose 
to read the indicators as a dismantled or disengaged threat. History indicates that 
this simply cannot be true.  
The 2006 National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism reminds us 
“Terrorism is not simply a response to our efforts to prevent terror attacks. The 
al-Qaida network targeted the United States long before the United States 
targeted al-Qaida.”19 Terrorists whose cause has not altered, circumstances not 
changed, nor demands been met, do not simply get tired and move on. The 
players may change to a degree, but unless enough of them have been killed, 
the threat exists. Certainly, we have seen continued success in decapitating 
many of the al Qaeda and affiliated leaders,20 including OBL. However, the 
19 White House Office, National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism (Washington, DC: The 
White House, September 2006), 9. 
20 Jenkins, New Challenges to U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts.  
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conditions that led to these terror organizations and acts have not changed 
substantially in the needed directions. The U.S. foreign policy, including presence 
in the Muslim lands, has not altered significantly, its support of Israel has not 
been withdrawn, and the caliphate has yet to be restored. “We have become 
more adept at disrupting terrorist networks; nevertheless, our terrorist 
adversaries continue to learn and adapt, posing an enduring threat to the security 
of America and its allies and partners.”21  
3. Long War 
It is evident that this conflict will not be decided in the near future 
but will persist, as did the Cold War, possibly for decades…22 
The reality is that despite the respite from major attacks on our soil and 
the shift of focus to Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Arab Spring nations, “violent 
Islamist extremism will remain a potent threat to American national security for 
the foreseeable future.23 “The 2010 QDR report also does not refer to the ‘long 
war.’”24 However, the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism proclaims that, 
“The United States deliberately uses the word ‘war’ to describe our relentless 
campaign against al-Qa’ida” and that we are in fact “at war” with that “specific 
organization” and its affiliates and adherents.25  
“Beyond al Qaeda we confront a protracted ideological conflict, of which 
the terrorist campaign waged by disconnected jihadists is a symptom.”26 Multiple 
simultaneous bombings in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, as well as 
numerous plots on airplanes in the past decade indicate that the enemy is still 
21 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2010), 6. 
22 Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation, 51. 
23 Lord, Nagl, and Rosen, “Beyond Bullets,” 9. 
24 Stephen Daggett, Quadrennial Defense Review 2010: Overview and Implications for 
National Security Planning (CRS Report No. R41250) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2010), 25. 
25 The terms Islamic extremists or fundamentalists are used to denote the same terrorist 
circles as al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents for this paper. 
26 Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation, 51. 
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determined to inflict spectacular, mass casualty carnage, made convenient by 
the mass transportation relied upon for daily life and economic viability.27  
4. Summary of Rationale for Focus on Radical Islamic Terrorism 
This thesis is organized on the principle that we are facing an enduring 
threat of terrorism, and therefore need to transition to strategies that will serve us 
for an unknowable, but lengthy period of time. The specific focus of this paper is 
on the threat of radical Islamic terrorism—or the al Qaeda brand—as not only 
based on the progenitor of the war, but also the continued greatest terrorist threat 
to the American homeland, and American interests and allies.28 This constraint 
serves four purposes:  
• Understanding the who is critical to deterrence theory. Only by 
knowing what motivates terrorist ideologies and individuals can a 
deterrence strategy be designed. 
• Although terrorism has been approached in several theoretical 
analyses whereby it is painted as a rational tool undertaken by 
disparate groups with a variety of motivations, which may be 
identified, and categorized, radical Islamic terrorism is unique in 
many ways. It would therefore be counterproductive if muddled with 
other terrorisms29 in this study. 
• The collective knowledge gained from the enormous efforts at 
understanding radical Islamic terrorists and terrorism offers an 
unparalleled wealth of information whereby policy may be 
designed.  
• As stated above, this is the enduring threat we face in coming 
years. 
A deterrence policy would likely look different for the other various threats 
of terrorism faced by the United States and globally. Although some strategies 
might be applicable from one group to the next, tailoring would be necessary to 
27 Jenkins, New Challenges to U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts. 
28 White House Office, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, 
2010). 
29 Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation, 116. 
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offer appropriate deterrents to eco-terrorists or national separatists, for example. 
The scope of this thesis does not allow for all these contingencies, however, but 
if the strategy is found effective, it may be adapted and applied across the 
spectrum of terrorism, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and narco-gangs/cartels. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Deterrence is both understood on the interpersonal (child rearing, 
relationships) and municipal (crime) levels, as well as at the state (security) level. 
The strategy long predates the Cold War, but is best understood through the 
Cold War model. This leads some to an incomplete comprehension or 
misunderstanding of the term. In order to apply the long history and nuances of 
what is generally a simple concept properly, a review of the uses and types of 
deterrence is worthwhile. The review of scholarly and policy writing for this thesis 
will consist of three major related parts.  
To begin, a summary of the concept of deterrence will offer a solid basis 
for all the remaining discussion in this paper, as deterrence is the foundation of 
the thesis. This necessarily includes an appreciative inquiry of Cold War 
deterrence. Next, the specific literature on deterrence of terrorism will be 
analyzed in a comparative context. And finally, an extensive review of the place 
of terrorism deterrence in national strategies since 9/11 will be helpful in 
revealing both the background thinking on the topic—and specifically how it has 
evolved in a short time—and the often, but not always corresponding place of 
deterrence as a strategy in the service of counterterrorism. This will be especially 
useful in working toward the Research Question posed above, and in support of 
the policy analysis methodology. 
1. What is Deterrence? 
The word deterrence, and all its variations, is part of our everyday lexicon. 
Fundamentally, the concept is that some directed unpleasantry may alter the 
decision to take some action. Potential incarceration is by some measure a crime 
deterrent. A costly divorce is a deterrent to unfaithfulness in a spouse. Hell is a 
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deterrent from evil acts, for those who believe (see “crime deterrent” for the rest). 
Punishment of some form inflicted on a child is a deterrent to future acts of 
disobedience. Because swaths of child psychology and the ordered society are 
contingent on the concept of deterrence, some understanding of the notion is 
instilled in us all. 
Patrick Morgan maintains, however, that in the realm of international 
politics, deterrence “is not easy to explain or understand,” despite being an “old 
practice.”30 Definitions of deterrence as a strategic entity generally include the 
concepts of actors or adversaries, actions, influence, and cost/benefit analyses. 
Simply put “deterrence arises from the fear of unacceptable consequences.”31 
More fully, “deterrence is a strategic interaction in which an actor prevents an 
adversary from taking an action that the cost of taking that action will outweigh 
potential gains.”32  
Deterrence can be thought of as an offshoot of persuasion, or coercion, as 
variations on influence, depending on the form. One distinction is that deterrence 
occurs to prevent an action before it is taken, “Methods, including the use or 
threatened use of force, to influence the decision calculus of adversary leaders to 
not undertake a specific action.”33 Bowen highlights this with the concept of 
status quo: “If a regime is already involved in some form of terrorist-associated 
activity, any threat to influence behaviour will be coercive and not deterrent 
because the aim will be altering the status quo; to put an end to the regime’s 
30 Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
1. 
31 Robert W. Anthony, “Deterrence and the 9–11 Terrorists,” Institute for Defense Analysis, 
May 2003, 14. 
32 Matthew Kroenig and Barry Pavel, “How to Deter Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly, 
Spring 2012, 22. 
33 Patrick J. Garrity, Schmuel Bar, and Keith B. Payne, Deterrence and Coercion of Non-
State Actors: Analysis of Case Studies (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 2008), 3. 
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terrorist-associated activity. However, deterrence is about preserving the status 
quo; keeping things as they are.”34 
Coercion and compellance are used interchangeably in the context of 
deterrence strategy.35 Morgan distinguishes between deterrence and 
compellance, which he defines as “the use of threats to manipulate the behavior 
of others so they stop doing something unwanted or do something they were not 
previously doing.”36 Though he admits, “the distinction between the two is quite 
abstract,”37 the crux rests upon dissuading the contemplation of an act versus 
one already in progress. Likewise, Payne defines coercion as “Methods, 
including the use of force, to compel adversary leaders to change behavior—to 
cease or undo an action that has already been taken, or to cause those leaders 
to take action they would not be inclined to take without the threat or use of 
force.38 In the end, “for the sake of simplicity” deterrence is used to include 
coercion and, similarly, Morgan determines deterrence and compellance should 
be used interchangeably. 
Long offers: “Deterrence, as both the manipulation of cost/benefit 
calculation and the generation of fear, is a form of coercion.”39 Chilton and 
Weaver divide the cost benefit into four decision points for adversaries: costs and 
benefits of taking an action and costs and benefits of continued restraint.”40 
Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO JOC) 2.0 approaches 
34 Wyn Q. Bowen, “Deterrence and Asymmetry: Non-State Actors and Mass Casualty 
Terrorism,” Contemporary Security Policy, 25, no. 1 (April 2004): 69.  
35 Bowen, “Deterrence and Asymmetry: Non-State Actors and Mass Casualty Terrorism,”  
36 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 2. 
37 Ibid.  
38 Garrity, Bar, and Payne, Deterrence and Coercion of Non-State Actors, 3. 
39 Austin Long, Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War: Lessons from Six Decades of Rand 
Research (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008), 8. 
40 Kevin Chilton and Greg Weaver, “Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,” 
Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2009, 34. 
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cost/benefit in a “portfolio approach” of three methods of influence, which are 
“closely linked in practice and often overlap in practice.”41 
Given a general understanding of what it is, the historical context of 
deterrence is explored in the next section. 
a. Historical 
Most contemporary authors’ concepts of deterrence tie back, either 
directly or indirectly to foundational work in the late 1950s and early 1960s: Most 
notably, Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (1960), and Arms and 
Influence (1966), and Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory 
of National Security (1961), as well as William Kaufmann, ‘”The Requirements of 
Deterrence” (1958). Chilton and Weaver explain the genesis: 
The advent of nuclear weapons did change the way states viewed 
warfare. The avoidance of nuclear war—or for that matter 
conventional was on the scale of World War I or World War II—
rather than its successful prosecution became the military’s highest 
priority. This spurred a tremendous amount flurry of intellectual 
activity in the 1950s and 1960s that sought to develop a fully 
thought-out theory of deterrence as well as a massive national 
effort to put that theory into practice to deter (and contain) the 
Soviet Union.42 
As a result, most modern concepts of deterrence are inexorably 
intertwined with the Cold War. Yet, “deterrence was an essential element of 
national security practice long before the Cold War and the introduction of 
nuclear arsenals into international affairs. For millennia, states have sought to 
convince one another that going to war with them was ill advised and 
counterproductive, and they sometimes responded to deterrence failures in a 
manner intended to send powerful deterrence messages to others in order to 
reestablish and enhance deterrence in the future.”43  
41 Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006), 24. 
42 Chilton and Weaver, “Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,” 42. 
43 Ibid. 
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A 2008 National Institute for Public Policy study examined 10 case studies 
of “Deterrence and Coercion of Non-State Actors” (NSA) spanning over 200 
years.44 The profiles included several states’ efforts to overcome various threats, 
ranging from 18th century Barbary piracy to 20th century urban terrorists in 
Europe to 21st century Palestinian groups. One conclusion of the study was that 
deterrence in these cases was “seldom an explicit goal of leaders of states,” and 
therefore developed through “painful” trial-and-error.45 “However, actions by 
states resulted in NSA leaders changing their behavior in ways that suggest that 
they were deterred from continuing their preferred course.”46 
Deterrence also played a notable role in World War II. It was actually a 
view of lack of credible deterrence that propelled Japan to attack the United 
States, but the devastating reality of the bombings of Japanese cities that 
deterred the nation from continuing the war. Beyond this point, and the 
“millennia” reference above, it was “after World War II, for the first time, 
deterrence evolved into an elaborate strategy.”47 This is detailed in the next 
section in regards to Cold War deterrence. 
b. Cold War 
“For more than 50 years during the Cold War, deterrence was a 
cornerstone of U.S. strategy.”48 In addition, “in the strictest Cold War sense,” 
deterrence “refers to the idea that you induce, even compel, an adversary not to 
do something by credibly threatening terrible pain and suffering in retaliation.”49 
The deterrence by punishment/retaliation was so much a part of Cold War lure, 
that this form became synonymous with the strategy on the whole. On the most 
44 Garrity, Bar, and Payne, Deterrence and Coercion of Non-State Actors. 
45 Ibid., 5. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 3. 
48 Kroenig and Pavel, “How to Deter Terrorism,” 21. 
49 Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America’s Secret 
Campaign against al Qaeda (New York City, NY: Times Books, 2011), 5. 
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fundamental level, the United Stats “aimed to prevent the Soviet Union from 
attacking the West by threatening to retaliate with a devastating nuclear 
response.”50 “This simplified certain aspects of deterrence and served as the 
basis for deterrence theory, deterrence postures, and specific policies.”51 
Conceptually, deterrence by denial (as opposed to retaliation) went to the back 
burner and grew cold.52  
Cold War projection of intentions and credibility were complex, despite the 
singular known state-level enemy. The majority of U.S. intelligence resources 
were directed at identifying and analyzing all that could be known about the 
enemy. The drivers of these investments are evident. “Nuclear weapons made it 
simple to threaten unacceptable damage, and that made it plausible that 
deterrence might work consistently.”53 
In sum, the Cold War both “simplified” deterrence strategy, and elevated 
its position in defense policy as never before. “Without nuclear weapons and the 
Cold War, deterrence would have remained an ‘occasional stratagem.’54 
Through decades of heightened tensions, head-on conflict, possibly resulting in 
the “unimaginable” was staved off primarily through a chess match of deterrence. 
While retaliatory deterrence dominated Cold War thinking, there are 
multiple methods of deterrence, and the primary methods as well as contributing 
nuances are detailed in the next section. 
c. Methods of Deterrence 
Because of the pervasive influence of Cold War deterrence on notions of 
the strategy, the common understanding centers on retaliation, or punishment as 
it more commonly identified. It is important to recognize that there are multiple 
50 Kroenig and Pavel. “How to Deter Terrorism,” 21. 
51 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 239. 
52 These methods of deterrence are further explored in the next section. 
53 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 240. 
54 Ibid., 3. 
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methods of deterrence to be considered against the post-Cold War and post-9/11 
threat environment. 
The Department of Defense Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0 breaks 
deterrence into three types: 
• credibly threaten to deny benefits or gains sought 
• credibly threaten to impose costs considered too painful to incur 
• encourage adversary restraint by convincing not taking the action 
will result in acceptable outcome.55 
Numbers one and two can be categorized in two fairly distinct 
mechanisms—deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment.56 These will 
be detailed here, and the entire “portfolio,” including “deterrence by encouraging 
adversary restraint” will be further explored throughout this paper. However the 
third form which depends more on diplomacy is not central to this thesis and will 
not be discussed in detail as the first two.57 
To summarize the distinction between the two main forms of deterrence 
examined here, Trager and Zagorcheva hold that it is “generally true that ‘where 
punishment seeks to coerce the enemy through fear, denial depends on causing 
hopelessness.’”58 
(1) Deterrence by Punishment. “Deterrence by cost imposition involves 
convincing adversary decision-makers that the costs incurred in response to or 
as a result of their attack will be both severe and highly likely to occur.”59 This is 
55 Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0, 24. 
56 Long, Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War. 
57 Trager and Zagorcheva offer two elements to deterrence strategy: “(1) a threat or action 
designed to increase an adversary’s perceived costs of engaging in a particular behavior, and (2) 
an implicit or explicit offer of an alternative state of affairs if the adversary refrains from that 
behavior,” These align quite well with 1. (punishment) and 3. (persuasion) above. However, they 
then go on to discuss “punishment” and “denial” throughout their paper, as is done here. Thus, 
despite this seeming incongruity, their views align with this author’s. 
58 Robert Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done,” 
International Security 30, no. 3 (2005/06): 91.  
59 Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0, 26. 
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stated simply enough, and constitutes the form of deterrence most people are 
familiar with, as discussed above. Morgan also offers a plain explanation of the 
punishment form: “The essence of deterrence is that one party prevents another 
from doing something the first party does not want by threatening to harm the 
other party if it does.”60 
Generally, “Threatened punishment is typically directed at an adversary’s 
leadership and at assets highly valued by the leadership.”61 This rule may be 
stretched when applied to terrorism, based on systems complexities, such as the 
involvement of sponsors, and at the opposite end of the spectrum, “lone wolves” 
whose leadership may be self-directed. 
Furthermore, this distinction may be subdivided: “Threatening the NSA 
itself with punishment may be regarded as direct deterrent strategy; threatening 
the NSA’s host or patron in the expectation that they will put pressure on the 
NSA may be regarded as an indirect deterrent strategy.”62 
(2) Deterrence by Denial. The little brother to punishment deterrence 
strategy is denial. “When considering deterrence, many analysts think solely in 
terms of deterrence-by-retaliation, but deterrence theorists also advance a 
second type of deterrence strategy: benefit denial, or deterrence-by-denial.”63 
“Deterrence by denying benefits involves convincing adversary decision-makers 
that the benefits they perceive are of little value and/or are unlikely to be 
achieved by taking the COA (course of action) the US seeks to deter.”64 Again, 
the focus on “decision-makers,” but in the case of denial, application must be 
considered for all parts of terrorist organizations. 
60 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 1. 
61 Garrity, Bar, and Payne, Deterrence and Coercion of Non-State Actors, 14. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Kroenig and Pavel, “How to Deter Terrorism,” 23. 
64 Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0, 26. 
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Protection of critical infrastructure is one of the foundational forms of 
deterrence by denial implemented in the post-9/11 U.S. security environment. 
Many authors isolate this piece of denial. Trager and Zagorcheva assert, “denial 
involves ‘hardening’ targets in the hope of making an attack on them too costly to 
be tried and convincing terrorists of the state’s determination not to make 
concessions in the face of terror tactics.”65 Taquechel and Lewis explain these 
tactics to be, “investments to reduce attacker expected utility by influencing 
attacker capability, target vulnerability, and target consequence.66 
Though less familiar to most, based on the Cold War affect cited above, 
denial has been a long-standing deterrence strategy. In the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) case studies summary, the authors found 
that historically: “Denial methods were used by states against NSA threats, to 
attrite NSA threat capabilities, and to reduce the consequence of NSA attacks.”67 
Nor is this strategy unfamiliar to the nation that put deterrence on the policy map. 
“The ability to deny an adversary its goals—whether the goals are political, 
territorial, material, or other—has been a long-standing element of U.S. deterrent 
strategy against states.”68 
(3) Nuances: Messaging, Credibility. For deterrence to have a hope of 
effectiveness, the targeted audience, or deteree, must first be aware of the 
potential consequences of an action, and then also believe these to be viable. 
“Deterrence is ultimately about decisively influencing decision making. Achieving 
such decisive influence requires altering or reinforcing decision makers’ 
perceptions of key factors they must weigh in deciding whether to act counter to 
US vital interest or to exercise restraint.”69 
65 Trager and Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism,” 91. 
66 Eric F. Taquechel and Ted G. Lewis, “How to Quantify Deterrence and Reduce Critical 
Infrastructure Risk,” Homeland Security Affairs, 8, no. 12 (August 2012): 2. 
67 Garrity, Bar, and Payne, Deterrence and Coercion of Non-State Actors, 14–15. 
68 Ibid., 14. 
69 Chilton and Weaver, “Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,” 33. 
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As a strategy, deterrence may be thought of as an overt message that 
some unwelcomed action will be met with an action sufficiently unpleasant so as 
to inhibit the first party from taking the initial action. The distinction is important 
for the scope of this paper. What differentiates deterrence as a concept and 
deterrence as an effective policy is the overt message part. “For both deterrence 
by punishment and deterrence by denial strategies to be successful, two 
conditions must hold: the threatened party must understand the (implicit or 
explicit) threat, and decisionmaking by the adversary must be sufficiently 
influenced by calculations of costs and benefits.”70  
Credibility is also an integral part of deterrence definitions: “Deterrence is 
a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of 
unacceptable counteraction (Department of Defense Dictionary 1994).”71 
“Credibility has long been viewed as a key aspect of deterrence: to deter, the 
adversary must perceive the ally as having both the capability and the will to 
carry out threatened actions, whether to impose costs or deny benefits.”72 For 
the Cold War, this dynamic was uncomfortably unknowable. “Deterrence stability 
required credible threats, but nuclear deterrence made credibility suspect.”73 
Furthermore, for deterrence to be effective there are two forms of 
credibility necessary. Long cites Kaufmann’s early work (1958) delineating these 
two required elements: “the credible capability to harm and the credible intent to 
carry out this harm.”74 
Credible capability is further divided to three elements: aggregate forces, 
proximity, and power-projection capability. In Cold War terms, these dynamics 
are easy to see. The aggregate forces would be arms buildup and capabilities, 
70 Trager and Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism,” 91. 
71 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 1. 
72 M. Elaine Bunn. “Can Deterrence Be Tailored?” Strategic Forum, no. 225, January 2007, 
5. 
73 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 241. 
74 Long, Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War, 8. 
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and all that it entails. Proximity is more than inter-continental ballistic missile 
capability. The strategic vying for proximate allied territory to place the missiles 
was testimony to this. Finally, power-projection is the other “forces that mitigate 
distance.”75 These sub-divisions are clearly applicable to transnational terrorism. 
In summary, credibility is “the linchpin of deterrence.”76 “The clarity and 
credibility of American messages in the mind of the deterree are critical to 
tailoring deterrence threats.”77 However, the issue of credibility can be “murky 
despite its tangibility” and “in the intangible realm of intentions is much more 
opaque.”78 That is to say, reputation is critical toward clarifying the credibility of 
deterrence.  
The above section of literature review sought to define deterrence in 
general terms and in historical context, as well as breaking the concept into 
distinct methods and examining meaningful complementary dynamics. The next 
section will specifically focus on what is held in the literature on deterrence 
specific to terrorism.  
2. Deterrence of Terrorism 
In general, there is more agreement in schools of thought on deterrence of 
terrorists or non-state actors, than divergence. Four main themes emerge: 
methods, tailoring, communication/credibility, and significance of strategy. Each 
of these areas will be discussed individually, followed by some other noteworthy 
findings. 
a. Deterrence Methods for Non-state Adversaries 
The literature on terrorism deterrence offered three distinct and recurring 
methods of imposing fear toward the adversaries’ operational calculus. Two—
75 Long, Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War, 12. 
76 Ibid., 13. 
77 Bunn, “Can Deterrence Be Tailored?,” 1. 
78 Long, “Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War,” 13. 
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punishment and denial—have been discussed above in the general discussion of 
deterrence, and the third—encourage restraint—was also mentioned in the 
outset of this chapter. However the shades with which authors believe these are 
applicable run almost every combination.  
For starters, some authors, such as Long (Rand) and Department of 
Defense (DOD) (DO JOC) offer “Deny Benefits, Impose Costs, and Encourage 
Adversary Restraint” as equal entities. Additionally, Davis and Jenkins use a 
“portfolio” approach, as does the DOD Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 
which is more of a spectrum of the three approaches and all of which are 
presented and weighed on their own merits. 
Probably the most agreed upon are those that see deterrence as a choice 
between Imposing Costs/Punishment and Denying Benefits/Denial. Among this 
group, Chilton and Weaver, Bowen, and Kroenig and Pavel presented the two 
equally (Kroenig and Pavel further subdivided each into direct and indirect, 
thereby offering four strategic choices). Trager and Zagorcheva put more 
emphasis on Denial and Garrity et al. more on Punishment. Finally, one author 
(Fisher) primarily framed deterrence through Retaliation (Punishment) and one 
(Smith) primarily through Denial, and perhaps the least conforming, Chilton and 
Weaver offered Denied Benefits and Encouraged Restraint and left Punishment 
completely out.  
Cronin and Cronin dissented, “We will never be able to stamp out 
terrorism completely, and deterrence by denial simply will not work against 
terrorists seeking martyrdom.”79 Klaus-Dieter Schwarz, writing for a German 
publication, made the case for the carrot with the stick: “Deterrence by 
punishment and denial alone is insufficient. It must be combined with a policy of 
79 Patrick M. Cronin and Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Challenging Deterrence: Strategic Stability in 
the 21st Century,” A Special Joint Report of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and 
the Oxford University Changing Character of War Programme, February 2007, 26. 
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compromise and engagement that seeks to influence the structures and causes 
of conflict.”80 
b. Tailoring Deterrence for Terrorist Actors 
There was great consensus among authors that tailoring deterrence is a 
necessary part of the approach to employing the strategy in the asymmetrical 
threat environment. Even prior to 9/11, Ian Lesser determined: “A shorthand for 
this challenge might be ‘personalized’ deterrence. Our counterterrorism policy 
already shows an inclination in this direction…”81 In an early post-9/11 work, 
Davis and Jenkins referred to it as “broad front strategy,” which they pointed out 
was normally frowned upon in military strategy. In their case studies, Garrity, Bar, 
and Payne found, “Attempts to deter or coerce NSAs can draw on an array of 
possible methods and means.”82 For Whiteneck, this “could seek to influence 
moderate elements within terrorist networks.”83 
One of the few voices of dissention, Uri Fisher worried, “the requirements 
to deter individuals within a terrorist system will force policymakers to 
compromise some very basic and sacrosanct American values.”84 However, in 
general, tailoring was considered to be intelligent and necessary for terrorism 
deterrence strategy. 
c. Communicating and Credibility of Deterrence Threat 
Communication and credibility, although separate component of 
deterrence strategy, were almost always presented in unison. One way this was 
80 Klaus-Dieter Schwarz, “The Future of Deterrence” SWP Research Paper, German Institute 
for International and Security Affairs, June 2005, 27. 
81 Ian O. Lesser, “Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy,” in Countering the 
New Terrorism, ed. Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini 
and Brian Michael Jenkins (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Project Air Force, 1999), 131. 
82 Garrity, Bar, and Payne, Deterrence and Coercion of Non-State Actors, 37. 
83 Daniel Whiteneck, “Deterring Terrorists: Thoughts on a Framework,” The Washington 
Quarterly 28, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 197. 
84 Uri Fisher, “Deterrence, Terrorism, and American Values,” Homeland Security Affairs 3, 
no. 1 (February 2007): 10. 
 25 
                                            
played out was the through the notion that credibility must be properly 
communicated for deterrence to be effective. However, the concepts also stand 
alone, as in credibility is vital and communication of the threat (to the deterree) is 
important. 
Chilton and Weaver point up the complexity necessitating a tailored 
approach and communicating as such, “If there are multiple individuals in the 
political system capable of making and executing the decisions we seek to 
influence, our deterrence strategy will need to have multiple focal points and 
employ multiple means of communicating a complex set of deterrence messages 
that in turn take into account the multiplicity of decision makers.”85 
Finally, Davis and Jenkins took the strategy of communication one step 
further: “We find it striking that political warfare (the war of information and ideas) 
is so obviously missing in the current effort.”86 
d. Significance of Deterrence Strategy to Counterterrorism 
The general agreement upon the place or importance of deterrence in 
overall CT strategy is that it should be “employed as part of a broad strategy”87 
or “a component of U.S. grand strategy.”88 It was called necessary, but not 
sufficient, an important weapon in the counterterrorism arsenal,”89 and a useful 
element of broader strategy.”90 Bowen had an interesting take, considering the 
relation with other strategies despite its own limited role: “Deterrence can 
realistically be only one element of a much broader counter-terrorist effort. 
85 Chilton and Weaver, “Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,” 33. 
86 Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A 
Component in the War on al-Qaeda (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 46. 
87 Colin S. Gray, Maintaining Effective Deterrence (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 
Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, August 2003), x. 
88 Long, Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War, 85. 
89 Trager and Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done,” 88. 
90 Garrity, Bar, and Payne, Deterrence and Coercion of Non-State Actors, 40. 
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However the preparations and activities associated with other approaches should 
serve to strengthen the deterrence aspect.”91 
e. Other Factors  
Noteworthy overlap in some other areas concerned the importance of 
conducting deterrence within the context of “American values” (Davis and 
Jenkins, Fisher) and the necessity of cooperation of friendly states (Garrity. Bar, 
and Payne, Trager and Zagorcheva, “The Return Address Problem,” 108) and/or 
the problems associated with unfriendly states (Davis and Jenkins). 
Also, as noted in the section above, there was considerable discussion on 
the intermingling of terminologies related to deterrence, Deterrence and 
Coercion: Garrity, Bar, and Payne; Deterrence and Influence: Davis and Jenkins; 
compellance, dissuasion, inducement, preemption, prevention: Gray. 
Finally, unique to this analysis were two interesting points:  
• There was a surprisingly generous amount of literature directly or 
closely related to the specific topic. 
• Even in glancing at some titles, an evolution of thought is evident: 
• Lesser, “Countering the New Terrorism” (1999) 
• Davis and Jenkins, “Deterrence and Influence in 
Counterterrorism” (2002) 
• Anthony, “Deterrence and the 9/11 Terrorists” (2003) 
• Gray, “Maintaining Effective Deterrence” (2003) 
• Smith, “A Strategic Response to Terrorism: A Framework for 
U.S. Policy” (2003) 
• Bowen, “Deterrence and asymmetry: non-state actors and 
mass casualty terrorism” (2004) 
• Klaus-Dieter Schwarz, “The Future of Deterrence” (2005) 
• Whiteneck, “Deterring Terrorists: Thoughts on a Framework” 
(2005) 
91 Bowen, “Deterrence and Asymmetry: Non-State Actors and Mass Casualty Terrorism,” 69. 
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• Trager and Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be 
Done” (2005/06) 
• DOD, “Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept.” 
(2006) 
• Colby, “Restoring Deterrence” (2007) 
• Bunn, “Can Terrorism be Tailored?” (2007) 
• Fisher, “Deterrence, Terrorism, and American Values” 
(2007) 
• Long, “Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War” (2008) 
• Chilton and Weaver, “Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First 
Century” (2009) 
• Kroenig and Pavel, “How to Deter Terrorism” (2012) 
From the low key “Countering,” and Davis and Jenkins softening the title 
of their study with the inclusion of “Influence,” to mid-decade proclamations of 
“The Future, Restoring, and It Can Be Done,” to the confident “How to” and 
“Waging” most recently, the changing thoughts on deterrence are inferred. This 
dynamic thinking translated to national strategies as will be examined below. 
3. Role of Deterrence in Post-9/11 National Strategies 
A host of strategies to protect from, prevent, preempt, prepare for, 
mitigate, counter, respond to, and recover from terrorism in the homeland have 
been introduced and enacted since late 2001. Many of these have proven costly, 
some controversial, and the effectiveness has ranged from creating more 
terrorists, to uncertain, to the stark absence of a major attack in the homeland in 
over a decade. If we are facing a long term threat, as proposed here, the 
sustainability of such efforts becomes a larger question than effectiveness 
(although they are calculated together in a benefit analysis), particularly in the 
absence of another major attack on our soil, waning will, skepticism of threat, and 
tiring of American psyche. 
National strategies have understandably evolved since 2001 to reflect the 
dynamic threat environment, changing administrations, and progress in the war 
on terror, as well as the needed maturation in a fledgling (homeland security) 
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enterprise. To some degree, these strategies reflect underlying thought and 
research in the many disciplines associated with security policy. The place for 
deterrence of the asymmetrical threat within these national strategies shall be 
examined by segmenting the time into three periods coinciding with presidential 
administrations, as well as major phases in the evolution of deterrence thinking. 
This progression should be evident, although the actual reflection in active policy 
may not be as obvious. 
a. Early: 2001–2004 
In the first months and years after 9/11, much of the focus was 
(understandably) directed at what learning could be applied from details about al 
Qaeda, OBL, and the actual 9/11 plot and attacks, as well as previous al Qaeda 
operations. One study conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) 
sought to discover if deterrence would have impacted the 9/11 terrorist attacks.92 
The conclusions drawn were noteworthy: Even a single instance of deterrence 
over the scores of opportunity points, such as a hijacker being challenged by 
airport security on a test flight (dry run), may have altered the entire operation; 
“the terrorists were cautious and risk averse, yet we as a nation failed to 
challenge them at the threshold levels necessary to deter their attack.”93 Looking 
through the rearview lens of eleven hijack-free years on U.S. airlines offers a 
perspective that even a portion of the post 9/11 security implementations for air 
travel are sufficiently effective.94 
(1) Skepticism. Nevertheless, deterrence was viewed with great 
skepticism in the early years after 9/11. “In the aftermath of the September 11 
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, academics and 
92 Anthony, “Deterrence and the 9–11 Terrorists.”  
93 Ibid., 2. 
94 A pitfall of this study is that drug smugglers were used as the basis for analysis in 
determining behavioral choices for the hijackers/suicide terrorists. Clearly the motivations of these 
two groups are very different, which, as this thesis postulates, is critically important in deciding on 
effective methods of deterrence. 
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policymakers were quick to dismiss the strategic role that deterrence could play 
in U.S. counterterrorism policy.”95 
Generally the early “case against the use of deterrence 
strategies…rest(ed) on three pillars:” Irrational actors, highly motivated/willing to 
die, and ‘lack of return address.”96 Jenkins and Davis took up the mantle of 
determining the feasibility of applying deterrence in a new threat environment 
early on. One summary of their findings was expressed this way: “The concept of 
deterrence is both too limiting and too naïve to be applicable to the war on 
terrorism.”97 In fact, even prior to the undertaking, these terror experts 
determined that deterrence was so limiting, that they added influence to the study 
to bolster it.  
“The attacks not only raised obvious questions about whether it would be 
possible to deter non-state actors willing to commit suicide for their cause. They 
also accentuated concerns about Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)-seeking 
rogue states. In response, the George W. Bush administration announced a new 
doctrine of preemption, leading many observers to conclude that US strategy had 
abandoned deterrence.”98  
Succeeding President Bush’s widely cited proclamation that the “enemy 
cannot be deterred,” the 2002 National Security Strategy demonstrated the move 
away from deterrence: “The United States can no longer simply rely on 
deterrence to keep the terrorists at bay or defensive measures to thwart them at 
the last moment.”99  
95 Fisher, “Deterrence, Terrorism, and American Values,” 1. 
96 Trager and Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism,” 87. 
97 Davis and Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism, xviii. 
98 Jeffrey W. Knopf, “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,” Contemporary Security 
Policy 31, no. 1 (April 2010): 2. 
99 White House Office, National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
(Washington, DC: The White House, 2002), 8. 
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Following the attacks, national and homeland security were seen as 
closely aligned missions with common threats. Under the heading, “Prevent Our 
Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, Our Friends with Weapons of Mass 
Destruction,” the 2002 National Security Strategy demarcates past and future:  
The nature of the Cold War threat required the United States—with 
our allies and friends—to emphasize deterrence of the enemy’s use 
of force, producing a grim strategy of mutually assured destruction. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, 
our security environment has undergone profound 
transformation…the United States can no longer solely rely on a 
reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a 
potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the 
magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our 
adversaries’ choice of weapons do not permit that option.100 
(2) References. Early U.S. CT strategy did reference the term 
“deterrence” as a focal point. For example, the 2003 “Office for Domestic 
Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland Security” was subtitled, “Prevention and 
Deterrence.” Oddly, though, despite the reference, “deterrence” is not directly 
identified or referred to within the body of the document at all. Seemingly, then, 
all goals and guidelines the document sought to achieve were considered 
“deterrence.” In other words, there is a difference between the generic ideal of 
everything as deterrence and specific deterrence strategies, such as, “if x, then 
y” deterrence by punishment or the deterrence by denial as cited in the 9/11 
study above.  
A case could be made that anything done in the effort of counterterrorism 
is a deterrent, due to the nature of the threat. Gathering intelligence, preparing 
for response, mitigation…these could all be tied back to deterrence. Tacquechel 
and Lewis, demonstrate this claim in reference to (2011) Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8, in this way: “if we measure deterrence as a 
function of changing components of threat vulnerability and consequence, our 
100 White House Office, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002, 13.  
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deterrence efforts encompass the entire HSPD-8 spectrum.”101 However, going 
forward, for the purposes of this paper, the term deterrence is used as a 
preconceived strategic plan as an end in itself, as opposed to the blanket way it 
is used in the earlier strategies. Otherwise, it is watered down to the point of 
ineffectuality.  
The only direct reference to deterrence in the 2002 “National Strategy for 
Homeland Security” was for the purpose of comparison to Cold War intelligence. 
Whereas “early warning systems were the foundation for strategic nuclear 
deterrence because they provided the President with sufficient lead-time to make 
retaliatory decisions,”102 terrorists were elusive, distant, and even if tracked, 
difficult to target—and therefore unable to be deterred. The 2002 “National 
Security Strategy” more directly addressed this view as it relates to kinetic 
realities:  
The threats and enemies we must confront have changed, and so 
must our forces. A military structured to deter massive Cold War-
era armies must be transformed to focus more on how an 
adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might 
occur.103  
Clearly, deterrence in the early strategies was more of a byproduct of 
prevention than a goal in itself. For example, the document “Securing our 
Homeland: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan (2004) offers 
“detect, deter, and mitigate threats to our homeland” under “Prevention.”104 The 
2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security recognized “defensive action 
101 Taquechel and Lewis, “How to Quantify Deterrence and Reduce Critical Infrastructure 
Risk,” 2. 
102 White House Office, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 
2002, 15.  
103 Ibid., 29.  
104 Department of Homeland Security, Securing Our Homeland: U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security Strategic Plan (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2004), 
14. 
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works as a deterrent to terrorists weighing the potential effectiveness of their 
plans.”105  
(3) Summary of 2001–2004. In summarizing this period we might 
consider that just prior to the 2001 attacks, experts found that “deterring terrorists 
and their sponsors” should be a “core element” of national CT strategy.106 
However, “September 11 represented a profound failure of deterrence.”107 
Coupled with the emotions that carried the nation at the time, deterrence was 
largely dismissed soon after 9/11. However, by 2004, “Strategic Command was 
directed by the secretary of defense to develop a deterrence operations joint 
operating concept (DO JOC).”108 
b. Middle: 2005–2008 
As the homeland security enterprise moved into the next phase of maturity 
along with the installation of the second Bush administration, all began to breathe 
a bit for the relative quiet on the home front, and the reactive posture yielded in 
some quarters toward more deliberation of what lay ahead; though the Madrid, 
then London attacks punctuated the continued threat from al Qaeda.109  
(1) Revival. “In the spring of 2005, the administration started a high-
level review of its overall counterterrorism policy.”110 As referenced above, within 
weeks of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush had dismissed the notion of deterring 
terrorists, and policy and strategy followed suit. “Yet the reports of the demise of 
deterrence were greatly exaggerated.”111 The authors of Counterstrike identified 
that “just four years after declaring that deterrence ‘will not work’, the Bush 
105 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: 
The White House 2002), 17. 
106 Lesser, “Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy,” 127. 
107 Davis and Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism, 25. 
108 Chilton and Weaver, “Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,” 32. 
109 Hurricane Katrina also shifted the mission again, to “all hazards.” 
110 Trager and Zagorcheva. “Deterring Terrorism,” 122. 
111 Long, Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War, viii. 
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administration reconsidered in the 2006 National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism, writing: ‘A new deterrence calculus combines the need to deter 
terrorists and supporters from contemplating a WMD [weapons of mass 
destruction] attack, and failing that, to dissuade them from actually conducting an 
attack.”112  
Terrorism professionals and security strategists continued to tread the 
deterrence waters in similar fashion, with an eye on WMD, and by relation, Cold 
War-style applications, and as “a tool the United States should not ignore,”113 but 
apply as “part of a broader strategy against terrorism.”114 Reflective of this, 
Daniel Whiteneck wrote in The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2005, “Instead of 
abandoning deterrence or limiting it to state sponsors of terrorism…the key is to 
extend deterrence using conventional and nuclear forces to the societal elements 
that support terrorism.”115 Thus, with the view that “an adversary that prefers 
escalation regardless of the consequences cannot be deterred,”116 the 
suggestion was to target terrorists’ support systems. 
(2) Rational Actors. Trager and Zagorcheva ventured a bit further 
declaring, “Even the most highly motivated terrorists, however, can be deterred 
from certain courses of action by holding at risk their political goals, rather than 
life and liberty.”117 In their analysis, terrorists “are not irrational in a sense that 
makes them impossible to deter,”118 and all that would be required is that they 
“be sufficiently influenced by cost-benefit calculations.”119 By developing “a 
framework that specifies the types of deterrence strategies that can be effective 
112 Schmitt and Shanke, Counterstrike, 5. 
113 Whiteneck, “Deterring Terrorists,” 198. 
114 Ibid., 188. 
115 Ibid., 198. 
116 Ibid., 187. 
117 Robert and Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism,” 88. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid., 94. 
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against particular classes of groups and elements of terrorist networks,”120 they 
began to think in terms of tailored deterrence, and hoped to demonstrate that 
deterring terrorism “can be done.”121  
(3) Firm Language. By mid-decade, Cold War deterrence theory expert 
Matthew Kroenig had firmly concluded, “terrorists are deterrable. While they may 
have a preference structure that’s different than ours, they do value things—
things that we could hold at risk—and we can, therefore, influence their 
decisions.”122 In the summer of 2005, “Kroenig, and his mentor, (Barry) Pavel 
crafted a briefing to make the case that a combination of efforts—economic, 
diplomatic, military, political, and psychological, some highly classified and some 
carried out in the broad daylight of public debate—could in fact establish a new 
strategy and create a new and effective posture of deterrence against terrorist 
groups.”123  
“The strategy fed into the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 
which announced the Pentagon’s intentions to shift ‘from a “one size fits all” 
deterrence—to tailored deterrence for rouge powers, terrorist networks, and 
near-peer competitors.’” The QDR “also included an initiative to move beyond 
Cold War thinking about deterrence and called for ‘tailored deterrence,’ 
customized for each specific adversary to deter specific actions in specific 
situations.”124 
Other national strategies began to reflect this thinking also. The 
September 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism treated deterrence 
with more assuredness than the previous strategies. Primarily, it was discussed 
with regard to WMD, with explicit language promoting certain policy in line with 
Cold War deterrence—should terrorists and/or rouge states use them—and to an 
120 Robert and Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism,” 94. 
121 The subtitle of the paper. 
122 Schmitt and Shanke, Counterstrike, 51. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Garrity, Bar, and Payne, Deterrence and Coercion of Non-State Actors, 5. 
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extent as a functional wing of prevention. However, the discussion under 
prevention also offered deterrence as a stand-alone concept, rather than just 
another way to phrase defensive measures.  
Moreover, according to Rand, “The 2006 version of the national-security 
strategy returned deterrence to the lexicon of U.S. national defense.”125 Again, 
the focus was primarily WMD, but conceptually, this was the furthest deterrence 
had travelled in national strategy since 9/11: 
The new strategic environment requires new approaches to 
deterrence and defense. Our deterrence strategy no long rests 
primarily on the grim premise of inflicting devastating 
consequences on potential foes. Both offenses and defenses are 
necessary to deter state and non-state actors, through denial of the 
objectives of their attacks and, if necessary, responding with 
overwhelming force.126 
While this statement leans more toward state-level deterrence, the ideas 
of “both offensive and defensive,” and “denial of the objectives of their attacks” 
demonstrate serious evolution of thought. 
Likewise, the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security took a pass at 
the concept of terrorist deterrence strategy in a sub-section headed: “Deter the 
Terrorist Threat.”127 The reintroduced notion was presented in two parts: 
“Decreasing likelihood of success” and “Changing the motivational calculus.” The 
first part specifically references ‘deterrence by denial,’ and largely goes on to 
enumerate the ways that current strategies, such as target hardening, create this 
condition. The “motivational calculus” referred to harkens the familiar retaliatory 
125 Long, Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War, viii. 
126 White House Office, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
(Washington, DC: The White House, 2006), 22. 
127 Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: 
The White House, 2007), 25. Oddly, the subsection comes under the CI/KR section, but makes 
reference to the previously presented section “Prevent and Disrupt Terrorist Attacks,” referencing 
those activities as “part of our deterrent strategy,” The layout gives the feel of an afterthought. 
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form of deterrence: “Terrorist actors also can be deterred or dissuaded from 
conducting attacks if they fear potential consequences for their actions.”128 
Nonetheless, whereas the some theorists were emboldened, there is a 
distinct feel of testing-the-waters with the deterrence strategy presented here. 
Nothing new is presented toward implementation, but instead, it offers deterrence 
as almost a new way to look at the steps that are already implemented. 
Furthermore, the two pages on deterrence are presented under the chapter titled 
“Protect the American People, Critical Infrastructure, and Key Resources,” rather 
than the previous chapter, “Prevent and Disrupt Terrorist Attacks.”129 At the very 
least, this is a step forward from the previously held view that deterrence was 
intertwined with prevention. Here the emphasis is on deterrence by denial, 
specifically by hardening targets and thus reducing the chances for successful 
attacks. However, the second part clearly focuses on retaliation or punishment 
(“dissuaded from conducting attacks if they fear potential consequences…”). 
While this fits as the second form of deterrence under that heading, it may well 
have stood under the prevention section along with “deny,” “disrupt,” and 
“prevent.”  
(4) Summary of 2005–2009. Nevertheless, two hopeful pieces to be 
gleaned from this section are the introduction of deterrence by denial, and the 
reference to “terrorist actors,” signifying a deterrence targeting down to the 
individual (role); both themes of this thesis. 
Both strategists and Strategies in the mid-range of the decade-plus since 
9/11 reflected an increasing momentum toward resurrecting deterrence as a 
policy for the dynamic threat environment we face in the early 21st century. A 
2007 article by Uri Fisher in Homeland Security Affairs sought to keep the 
enthusiasm in check however, by questioning the policy against “American 
Values.” “What really prevent the U.S. from deterring terrorist,” he wrote, “is not 
128 Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 26. 
129 Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security. 
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the simple unsuitability of the strategic concept of deterrence, but America’s 
humanity, civility, and idealism.”130 Fisher’s contentions that in application, 
deterrence would be abhorrent and self-damaging in the end are partially 
reflective of some of the misguided conduct in the war on terror to that point in 
time, which was quite overtly eviscerated in the court of public opinion. 
Nevertheless, the idea of keeping with our ideals is one that was touched upon, 
though not so extensively, by just about every author writing on the topic, and is 
an important point. It will be more extensively discussed in the Analysis section 
below. 
Additionally, despite marked progress, the efforts to advocate for terrorist-
targeted deterrence strategies “encountered several roadblocks”131 in the second 
Bush administration. “Skeptical midlevel Pentagon bureaucrats refused to pass 
the ‘new deterrence’ concept up the chain of command. Partly, it was fear of the 
new; it was also obvious that this proposed strategy contradicted the Bush 
administration’s public line…”132 “As recently as May 2006, President George W. 
Bush said, “The terrorists have no borders to protect or capital to defend. They 
cannot be deterred—but they will be defeated.”133 
c. Late: 2009–2012 
The deterrence approach remains a poorly understood and 
underutilized element of U.S. CT strategy. It holds, however, great 
potential for helping to thwart future terrorist attacks.134 
The rising drumbeat from the academic and policy arenas toward more 
prominence for deterrence in national strategy offered renewed optimism with the 
incoming Obama administration in 2009. Chilton and Weaver wrote that year: “In 
our judgment, deterrence should and will remain a core concept in our twenty-
130 Fisher, “Deterrence, Terrorism, and American Values,” 2. 
131 Schmitt and Shanke, Counterstrike, 52.  
132 Ibid. 
133 Bunn. “Can Deterrence be Tailored?” 3. 
134 Kroenig and Pavel, “How to Deter Terrorism,” 22. 
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first century national security policy…because the concept itself is just as 
relevant today as it was during the Cold War.”135 
Knopf, in reviewing the “fourth wave” of deterrence research concluded 
the “area of greatest and most important consensus is that deterrence remains 
viable and relevant, even in dealing with terrorism.”136 Kroenig and Pavel, again 
in 2012, updated their thesis that “deterrence is an essential part of an effective 
counterterrorism approach,”137 in an article titled “How to Deter Terrorism.” 
Though policymakers likely derive information from this collective body of 
study and its authors and associates, the review of current homeland security 
strategy does not reflect trust in this school. This disconnect is, in part, an 
impetus for this paper. 
Although not a strategy per se, the Quadrennial Review of Homeland 
Security (2010) offers itself as “A Strategic Framework for a Secure 
Homeland.”138 Toward the goal of preventing terrorist attacks “within the United 
States,” “deter” is used in three of the five objectives. The first is with its old 
partner, “disrupt:”  
Deter and disrupt operations: Deter, detect, and disrupt 
surveillance, rehearsals, and execution of operations by terrorists 
and other malicious actors.139 
The others toward more innovative measures—as the continuum of post-
9/11 strategies go: 
Stop the spread of violent extremism: Prevent and deter violent 
extremism and radicalization that contributes to it. 
135 Chilton and Weaver, “Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,” 31. 
136 Knopf, “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,” 2. 
137 Kroenig and Pavel, “How to Deter Terrorism,” 33. 
138 Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: A Strategic 
Framework for a Secure Homeland (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2010). 
139 Ibid., 23. 
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Engage communities: Increase community participation efforts to 
deter terrorists and other malicious actors and mitigate 
radicalization toward violence.140 
The two remaining objectives are familiar calls for intelligence gathering 
and sharing and protection of “targets.” As with the earlier strategies, a case can 
be made that these measures constitute a form of deterrence by denial, by 
making successful attacks more difficult to enact. 
(1) Gleaning Meaning. What remains, then, is to discern whether these 
objectives stem from deterrence policy, or if “deter” is used as more of a 
convenient buzzword to denote and intermediary to “detect” and “defeat” as 
previously seen. The brief explanations under these headings offer an 
encouraging, but incomplete picture: “Reducing violent extremism will frustrate 
terrorist efforts to recruit operatives, finance activities, and incite violence; 
enhanced public preparedness…can help minimize fear and diminish the 
effectiveness of terrorist tactics.” In general, these efforts come under the denial 
umbrella. However, these initiatives lean more toward the DO JOC’s third form of 
deterrence listed above, which falls at the more passive or non-aggressive end of 
the scale: encourage adversary restraint by convincing not taking the action will 
result in acceptable outcome. The impetus for this is explained this way:  
When the Obama Administration came to power in 2009, it decided 
that it would increase the relative emphasis on non-kinetic 
measures to break the jihadists’ link to other Muslims and to widen 
the resulting gap. The primary goal of this ‘countering violent 
extremism” initiative was to stop the process of radicalization 
through non-coercive measures including social programs, counter-
ideology initiatives, and the delegitimization of al-Qaeda’s 
narrative.141 
140 Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 23. 
141 Mark E. Stout, “The Evolution of Intelligence Assessments of al-Qaeda to 2011,” in Ten 
Years Later: Insights on al-Qaeda’s Past & Future Through Captured Records, Conference 
Proceedings, ed. Lorry M. Fenner, Mark E. Stout, and Jessica L. Goldings (Washington, DC: 
National Defense University, September 2011), 37. 
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Thus in a spectrum of deterrence options, with destroying the enemy at 
one end, these measures would fall toward the opposite end, with many other 
possibilities between. 
The 2010 version of the National Security Strategy pecks from different 
parts of the deterrence spectrum based on the adversary. Distinction is made 
between “our focus on defeating al-Qa’ida and its affiliates in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and around the globe,” and “our determination to deter aggression and 
prevent the proliferation of the world’s most dangerous weapons.”142 Similar to 
earlier decade posture, deterrence is seemingly applied at state level and 
terrorist sought to be crushed.  
For homeland security, the strategy offers a familiar sounding prescription, 
which “relies on our shared efforts to prevent and deter attacks by identifying and 
interdicting threats, denying hostile actors the ability to operate within our 
borders, protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources, and 
securing cyberspace.”143 The details of the strategy’s aim to “Disrupt, Dismantle, 
and Defeat Al-Qa’ida and its Violent Extremist Affiliates,”144 consist of familiar 
goals, and although the term “deny” is generously applied to these descriptions, 
they are not necessarily new, innovative, or deterrence as it has been described 
here. 
Two strategy goals, which might constitute deterrence by denial initiatives, 
are “Resist Fear and Overreaction,” which feeds the goals of terrorism, and 
“Contrast Al-Qa’ida’s Intent to Destroy with our Constructive Vision,” which may 
also interplay with terrorist goals. The latter also syncs with the “outreach” 
approach detailed above in discussion of the QHSR. 
142 White House Office, National Security Strategy, 1. (emphasis added). 
143 Ibid., 18. 
144 Ibid., 19. 
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The 2010 National Strategy for Counterterrorism promises “an approach 
that is more focused and specific than were previous strategies.”145 Much of this 
is attributable to the clarity of the threat that has been gained over the course of a 
decade of intense kinetic activity and intelligence scrutiny.  
Similar to the preceding National Security Strategy, one goal (of eight) is 
to counter al Qaeda’s message and ideology. Otherwise, goals are familiar, such 
as eliminating safehavens and building partnerships.  
One notable section on building a culture of resilience seems to build out 
the concept of deterrence by denial, specifically focusing on “denying success to 
al-Qa’ida.” Actions taken “can deter them from attacking particular targets or 
persuade them that their efforts are unlikely to succeed. This represents a 
progression in thinking toward deterrence. However, the discussion centers on 
protection of assets and critical infrastructure, so while the presentation in terms 
of deterrence (by denial) is advanced, the strategy itself dates back to before 
9/11. Resilience will be covered in more detail in part III. 
(2) Tailored Approach. Finally, for the 2010 National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism, the “focused” or tailored approach has mainly to do with the 
location or local affiliate of the al Qaeda threat than any other factor. 
We have seen that the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review promoted a 
tailored deterrence for various state and non-state threats. The 2010 QDR, 
likewise features deterrence at all levels:  
Our deterrent remains grounded in land, air, and naval forces 
capable of fighting limited and large-scale conflicts in environments 
where anti-access weaponry and tactics are used, as well as forces 
prepared to respond to the full range of challenges posed by state 
and non-state groups. 
While U.S. forces are heavily engaged in current wars, the 
Department’s prevent-and-deter activities will be focused on 
ensuring a defense in depth of the United States; preventing the 
emergence or reemergence of transnational terrorist threats, 
145 White House Office, National Strategy for Counterterrorism, 2. 
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including Al Qaeda; and deterring other potential major 
adversaries.146 
And furthermore features the concept of tailoring: 
Credibly underwriting U.S. defense commitments will demand 
tailored approaches to deterrence. Such tailoring requires an in-
depth understanding of the capabilities, values, intent, and decision 
making of potential adversaries, whether they are individuals, 
networks, or states. Deterrence also depends on integrating all 
aspects of national power.147 
Deterrence strategy has gained some stature in the field of CT strategies, 
but progression against the starting point of almost nil leaves plenty of room for 
growth. 
(3) Summary of Literature Review. The review of the literature on 
deterrence was conducted here in three stages. The first section covered 
theoretical underpinnings of deterrence as well as touching on writings on the 
historical basis for its use and general methods and catalysts that are 
understood. Next the review specifically sought literature on the application of 
deterrence to terrorists, which was largely theory-based as little actual 
experience exists here. Finally, post-9/11 national strategies were combed for 
any policy direction toward deterrence of non-state actors. This was divided into 
three segments of time between 2001 and 2012, with some progression noted, 
as stated above. 
With the Literature Review as background, the next section will offer 
possible rationale for the undertaking in this thesis, for examining the use of 
deterrence in the asymmetrical threat environment. 
146 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, v–vi. 
147 Ibid., 14. 
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C. THE CASE FOR DETERRENCE IN THE ASYMMETRICAL THREAT 
ENVIRONMENT 
Deterrence, the unpalatable but indispensable part of the old cold 
war, will be an equally indispensable part of the strategy of the new 
long war.148 
Wars in the conventional sense, which have involved the United States, 
have been fought in tragic, but finite periods in the space inside a decade. 
However, for the unconventional experience, featuring first and foremost the Cold 
War with the former Soviet Union, multiple decades with a distant uncertain 
termination point is the precedent.  
Deterrence, based on mutually assured destruction, was the prominent 
strategy by which the United States conducted, endured, and eventually won the 
Cold War. This strategy was based on a firm belief that the adversary was 
rational, and backed by a broad effort at understanding that adversary by U.S. 
military and civilian intelligence and academic assets. In addition to the costs of 
these intellectual assets, an arms build-up greatly taxed the United States 
economically, but these costs eventually contributed to the fall of the enemy for 
what they were incurring in keeping pace. 
In the non-traditional war on terror that the United States launched into at 
the outset of the new millennium, deterrence was swiftly set aside,149 and 
preemption chosen as the course. Not only were terrorists largely viewed as 
irrational,150 and therefore unpersuadable, but as an asymmetric enemy failed to 
present viable targets for retaliation151—the fundamental mode of deterrence of 
the Soviet state. Furthermore, there seemed no answer to the question, how do 
you deter a suicide bomber?152 “How can one successfully deter attackers who 
see their own death as the ultimate (spiritual) gain, who have little they hold dear 
148 Long, Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War, viii. 
149 Knopf, “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,”  
150 Kroenig and Pavel. “How to Deter Terrorism,” 21. 
151 Long, Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War, 80. 
152 Ibid. 
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that we can threaten retaliation against, and who perceive continued restraint as 
the violation of what they see as religious duty to alter an unacceptable status 
quo through violence?”153 The messianic leader, whose influence extends across 
and down the organizational matrix to the eventual operatives, poses similar 
perplexing intangibles, if only on a wider scale.154 
1. Sustainable/Economical 
A decade has now passed since we realized we were at war. And as with 
the threat we faced from Soviet ballistic-missiles, we have dedicated our 
immense resources to understanding and tracking the enemy. This despite the 
difference between the knowledge that nuclear warheads could effectively wipe 
our nation from the planet and that the current adversary’s best effort to date was 
carried out using only blades and our own assets and liberties against us. And 
unlike the Cold War experience, there is no hope of the enemy bankrupting for 
spending corollary to our own. 
With the Iraq experience as a reminder that “the prevention of war is 
preferable to the waging of it,”155 we should be inclined to seek new solutions to 
perceived threats. “The United States must develop counterterrorist strategies 
that enable it to avoid major commitments of American forces.”156  
One thing our unilateral intelligence build-up offers us is a wealth of 
information about the enemy that we may be able to take advantage of in ways 
that have not been significantly employed before. Deterrence may be a viable, 
sustainable approach to counter terrorist threats as part of a comprehensive 
policy. For instance, whereas the initial belief (at least in general) was that 
terrorists, particularly suicide operatives, must be irrational actors, we have now 
153 Chilton and Weaver, “Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,” 37. 
154 Barry R. Schneider and Jarrold M. Post, ed. Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary 
Leaders and Their Strategic Cultures (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: USAF Counterproliferation 
Center, 2002). 
155 Chilton and Weaver, “Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,” 31. 
156 Jenkins, New Challenges to U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts, 3. 
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been told by psychologists and other social scientists that the opposite is true: 
terrorists are not only rational, but they have specific objectives and hold a great 
many things dear to them (some in common, and also on individual bases). 
2. Clean/Proportionate 
The costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the de facto fronts in the war on 
terror in the years following the 9/11 attacks, also informed Americans and their 
government of some of the rules by which the fight might best be conducted. 
Actions have effects, and veracity or exaggeration notwithstanding, perceptions 
of those actions sometimes greatly influence those who may be willing to conduct 
themselves in opposition to American efforts at order and security. Deterrence 
policy may offer a chance to wage actions against terrorist perpetrators that are 
both clean and proportionate, or even unobserved. If truly successful, deterrence 
would avoid actions altogether, kinetic or otherwise, and never move past the 
threat stage, as in the Cold War. This is improbable, as the policy would cover 
innumerable acts and actors posed by the asymmetrical threat, rather than the 
one, giant and cataclysmic one. Nevertheless, targeted acts of retaliation are the 
tit-for-tat responses that people in all places and cultures understand.157 
While deterrence in the current and future security environments 
may look substantially different from deterrence in the past and 
require different capabilities, the basic concept remains the same. 
Further, given the desire to preserve the United States as 
something other than a garrison state, deterrence will continue to 
be a major component of U.S. grand strategy.158 
157 Schneider and Post, ed. Know Thy Enemy. 
158 Long, Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War,” 85. 
 46 
                                            
III. DATA 
This chapter examines factors leading toward an analysis of deterrence 
strategies in three broad areas; Psychology of Terrorism, Conflicts for 
Comparison, and Typologies of Deterrence. The first section on psychology 
offers insight into what may or may not persuade purveyors of terrorism based on 
the understanding of motivations. The comparison section is intended to give 
some concrete examples of circumstances in which deterrence may be used in 
relation to the research question posed here. In some cases, it draws on cases 
covered in the Literature Review section for purposes of analysis. Finally, the 
typologies section offers an in-depth examination of the various potential 
applications of deterrence. All of these areas are factored into to the analysis in 
the following chapter.  
A. PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM 
Adversaries’ perceptions are the focus of all our deterrence 
efforts.159 
The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review proclaims that in order to 
“apply the most effective threat mitigation strategies possible, including 
understanding how best to protect against terrorist capabilities and deter and 
disrupt operations of those who would use terrorist tactics to advance their 
aims...We must develop a comprehensive understanding of the threats and 
malicious actors that have the desire and ability to harm the United States.”160  
It has been hypothesized here that the threat from the al Qaeda brand 
terrorists—violent Islamic extremists—offers exploitable attributes based on 
commonality of psychology. “Becoming a terrorist is more than just taking part in 
159 Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0., 
56. 
160 Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 21. 
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terrorist activities; it is transforming the self to arrive at a particular identity.”161 
These potential psychological chinks are founded on known shared histories and 
aspirations. As mentioned previously, the unparalleled investment by the United 
States and the West into understanding the motivations and strategies of these 
adversaries offers a singular opportunity to exploit this knowledge discerningly. 
For example, in summary of the Institute for Defense Analysis findings on 
“Deterrence and the 9-11 Terrorists,” the researchers concluded that the 
hijackers were “cautious and deliberate” and “clearly not in a hurry to sacrifice 
their lives in a failed attack.”162 They were further able to infer that, “in searching 
for consequences that would deter, we need to focus on their underlying fears – 
for example, feelings of being powerless, embarrassing one’s cause, or revealing 
broader unfolding plans, or bringing retaliation upon their supporters.”163 These 
separate, but related findings represent what will be discussed here under the 
headings of “Who are they?”—their influences based on history and perceptions 
and, “What do they want?”—their needs, desires, and motivations in committing 
acts of terror.  
1. Who Are They? 
At the heart of Islamic terrorism is the crisis of identity in Islamic 
communities.164 
Social scientists who have studied terrorists acting under the banner of 
Islam have noted several important characteristics that thread through these 
individuals. For example, shame165 and perceived injustice166 are two common 
themes for a large number of Muslims, particularly those living in the Arab lands. 
161 Fathali M. Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What they Experience and 
Why They Come to Destroy (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 15. 
162 Anthony, “Deterrence and the 9–11 Terrorists,” 14. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View. 
166 Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, Understanding Al Qaeda: The Transformation 
of War (London: Pluto Press, 2007). 
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There is also a belief that these perceptions extend beyond the geographic 
Muslim world: “Complex political, economic, social, and psychological factors 
have combined to create circumstances in which Muslim communities in both 
western and non-western countries, and practicing Muslims in particular, 
fundamentalist Muslims even more so, feel collectively threatened. This 
perceived threat is a distressing psychological experience, associated with 
feelings of collective shame, frustration, and anxiety.”167 Not surprisingly, 
however, those ascribing to radical Islam may feel the greatest impact. In a study 
of “How Islamist Extremists Quote the Qur’an,” researchers concluded that the 
greatest prevalence “deal with themes of victimization, dishonor, and 
retribution.”168 
a. Staircases to Terrorism 
The emotional response to these sensibilities moves many toward the 
lower levels of the “staircase to terrorism”—a metaphorical construct of 
psychologist Fathali Moghaddam.169 While the vast majority never ascends past 
the first levels, the understanding of these powerful perceptions informs the fight 
against those who chose to move well beyond a sense of injustice to committing 
or conspiring toward terrorists acts under the guise of Islamic teachings.  
Retaliation for perceived injustices has been cited as a foundational 
motivation for terror attacks against the United States and the West.170 “Every 
event, particularly ones with negative outcomes, is scrutinized with the 
assumption that a foreign power, usually England or America, is manipulating 
and corrupting individuals and institutions from behind the scenes. Even events, 
167 Fathali M. Moghaddam, How Globalization Spurs Terrorism: The Lopsided Benefits of 
“One World” and Why That Fuels Violence (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 
109. 
168 Jeffrey R. Halverson, R. Bennett Furlow, and Steven R. Corman, “How Islamist 
Extremists Quote the Qur’an,” Arizona State University Center for Strategic Communication 
(Report no. 1202) July 9, 2012, 2. 
169 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View.  
170 Mohamedou, Understanding Al Qaeda. 
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such as natural disasters, an earthquake for example, are routinely interpreted as 
reflecting the influence of Western powers.”171 
b. Justice 
Dynamic leaders like OBL and Anwar Awlaki have had great success in 
convincing followers that the United States has both indiscriminately targeted and 
killed innocent Muslims, and that is in fact at war with Islam. The U.S.-led 
invasions and operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as drone strikes in 
Pakistan and other U.S. interventions in the Muslim world have contributed to this 
narrative. The very presence of innumerable U.S. military and civilian personnel 
in these lands has led to collateral damage, accidental targeting, and a host of 
widely publicized outrages.  
“From the terrorists’ point of view, there can be no peace without justice—
as justice is defined by them of course.”172 What is important going forward, is 
not whether the perceived injustices are warranted or not, because both cases 
are true at this point. What we need to understand is that the desire for retaliation 
is real for many Muslims. A portion will act on this hunger via terrorism. How do 
we exploit this attribute in a program of deterrence? 
c. Religiosity  
Deep religious tenets are of obvious importance to subscribers of al 
Qaeda ideology.173 In fact, “Fundamentalist Islam is on the rise in large part 
because it is the only movement and ideology being given room to offer a 
solution to the identity crisis being experienced in Islamic communities.”174 
Therefore, a nuanced understanding of radical forms of Islam is needed, as 
certain beliefs may be distorted from what is commonly understood. For 
example, selling drugs would be an expected prohibition, however radical 
171 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View, 50.  
172 Ibid., 7. 
173 At least they are professed to be. 
174 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View,” 145. 
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jihadists use the principle of takfir wal hijra—whatever it takes for the cause—to 
work around this.175 Another obvious example of this would be the murder of 
innocent humans, which is also justified for the cause. Also, dichotomies 
surrounding the views of sex are more than noteworthy, as discussed below. 
Understanding these distinctions is necessary, lest we make assumptions about 
an individual’s or group’s value on life, or views on morality, family, kinship, or 
money and so forth.  
d. Shame 
Many psychologists hold that, “The most salient emotional experience of 
Islamic communities over the last few decades has been feelings of collective 
shame.”176 Shame over American backed dictators or having little or no control 
over “events that impact them daily, and no merit-based opportunities in their 
own societies.”177 On the flip-side of the coin from shame is pride. How can the 
importance of pride be used advantageously toward deterrence, if at all? Is pride 
predominantly a male quality? Is it equally prevalent across Muslim ethnicities, or 
more so in Arabs? Is pride only personal, or does it extend to families and tribes?  
Drawing on conclusions from a study of the 9/11 hijackers, Anthony 
posited that radical Islamic terrorists “probably would not wish to appear as 
powerless or inept, embarrass their cause, reveal larger plans, or bring shame on 
their families and supporters.”178 One reason for the leap from personal pride to 
the family level in this study may have something to do with the hijackers being 
dead (or imprisoned) at the termination of the mission. However, dead or alive, if 
shame brought upon family members, kin, or the terror group (who call each 
other “brothers”) is an important source of fear or caution, this can be exploited. 
175 Seth G. Jones, Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of al Qa’ida since 9/11 (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2012), 165. 
176 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View,” 70. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Anthony, “Deterrence and the 9–11 Terrorists,” 1. 
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One interesting exception, in relation to the existential shame, is the lone 
wolf or self-radicalized Islamic terrorist. By virtue of the “lone” status, these 
individuals have no group to answer to. The family ties may also be in question 
for these terrorists. Faisal Shazad, the Times Square bomber, had a strained 
marriage at the time of his attempted act, and his wife had previously taken their 
two children to Saudi Arabia to live with her parents while he continued to reside 
in Connecticut.179 Nadal Hassan, the Fort Hood shooter, lost both his parents 
and was unmarried.180 These examples may offer cursory indication that a 
shame strategy extended beyond the self, might not work for lone wolves. 
However, it may also be that the threat of personal shame would carry even 
stronger sway for members of this category. Without external beings to share 
personal triumphs or conflicts with, loners may become more egocentric, 
magnifying the importance of a personal crusade. If it is found that there is a 
pattern between lone wolf actors and weak or absent familial ties that information 
will help to inform the deterrence choices made for this type. 
e. Relative Deprivation 
Psychologists have long considered the conditions or feelings of 
deprivation in regards to the path to terror. After 9/11, it was often cited that OBL 
was a multi-millionaire, and that others of the hijackers or in the network were 
well-to-do and/or educated.181 Consequently, attributes related to poverty or any 
absolute deprivation have been largely dismissed as underlying motivations for 
choosing a path of terrorism. Moghaddam sums it by saying, “if poverty were a 
root cause, most of the world would be terrorists”182  
179 Wikipedia, s.v. “Faisal Shahzad,” last modified August 16, 2014, http://en.wikipedia. 
org/wiki/Faisal_Shahzad. 
180 Wikipedia, s.v. “Nidal Malik Hasan,” last modified September 3, 2014, http://en.wiki 
pedia.org/wiki/Nadal_Hassan. 
181 White House Office, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.  
182 Fathali M. Moghaddam, “Radicalization and Terrorism in Global Context” (lecture, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, April 24, 2012). 
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A more promising concept is relative deprivation, whereby the frustration 
and envy stems from perception of one’s place or identity in the world. As 
example of this, we can imagine a person who may be financially well off in 
absolute terms; perhaps in the top ten percent of the world in terms of wealth, as 
many Americans are. Commonly enough, this individual may find reasons to feel 
deprived in relation to someone else within the scope of cognition who appears 
to have more or have it better. In absolute terms, the individual is still quite 
advantaged, but their relative perception causes disillusionment. Reality and 
perception do not always jibe when related to envy.  
Furthermore, relative deprivation is not only limited to monetary or material 
things. “From the viewpoint of Relative Deprivation Theory, terrorism is an 
outcome of rising, unmet expectations, and increasing frustration among millions 
of young people who feel they have no voice, no hope, and no possibilities for a 
brighter future as things stand.”183 Increasingly, globalization contributes to the 
sense of relative deprivation. “The young in Islamic societies see how life could 
be—the rich educational opportunities, the consumer goods, and social and 
political freedoms—but in their own societies they see no opportunities to 
achieve such a life.”184 
f. Group Association 
Relative deprivation can manifest itself on both individual and group 
levels. Egotistical relative deprivation occurs “when an individual feels personally 
deprived as a result of making interpersonal comparisons between himself and 
others.” Fraternal relative deprivation, is “when group members feel deprived 
because of the situation of their group relative to other groups.”185 “In the context 
of Islamic communities, fraternal relative deprivation is highly prominent, because 
people are encouraged to compare their group situation with that of out-
183 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View,” 23. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Moghaddam, How Globalization Spurs Terrorism, 49. 
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groups.”186 Where “fraternal” feelings are this strong, the same communal sense 
can be useful across a spectrum of deterrence. 
Relative deprivation may lead to strong feelings of envy, and when 
coupled with other psychological factors and religious fervor, can exhort some on 
the continued climb up the staircase to terrorism. One’s identity “is based on 
cognition, but perhaps even more importantly it is based on emotions, such as 
shame and anger.”187 Whether these feelings are justified or not is not important. 
Awareness and understanding of deep-seated psychological beliefs offers 
planners a tool for designing deterrence strategies. 
g. Displaced Anger/Projection 
Intertwined with feelings of relative deprivation fostered by globalization 
and induced by images of the American lifestyle, many begin to displace their 
anger to the perceived source of their displeasure: The Great Satan is to blame. 
A psychological term to describe this might be “projection.” 
Victoroff, in reviewing psychological approaches to understanding the 
“mind of the terrorist” determined “that the salient feature of terrorist psychology 
is projection, an infantile defense that assigns intolerable internal feelings to an 
external object when an individual who has grown up with a damaged self-
concept idealizes the good self and splits out the bad self.”188 The United States 
is an easy choice for extremist Islamic projection: “The more dissimilar an out-
group is, the more likely it is to be selected as a target for displaced 
aggression.”189 The final piece of this particular puzzle, and perhaps the factor 
that pushes violent Islamic extremists further up the staircase, ironically comes 
from self-imposed repression stemming from their very own religious adherence. 
186 Moghaddam, How Globalization Spurs Terrorism, 49. 
187 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View, 32. 
188 Jeff Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological 
Approaches,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49, no. 1 (2005). 
189 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View, 17. 
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h. Repression/Self-Repression 
One threat of globalization is the bombardment of evidence of the modern 
living accoutrements enjoyed in western (and eastern) societies. By contrast, 
fundamentalist Muslims may seek to live a stark existence further leading to 
feelings of relative deprivation. From his early days in Sudan, “Bin Laden forbade 
the use of most modern amenities on the compound—including refrigerators, 
electric stoves, and air conditioning—arguing that Muslims must scorn modern 
conveniences.”190 Viewing these contrasting lifestyles creates an internal conflict 
in young Muslims.  
Islam is considered the foundation of life to the most fervent believers; 
Islam influences every aspect of a Muslim’s life. Add to that, the conclusion of 
Mogghadam, “The most important aspect of societal conditions is how people 
answer the basic questions about their identities, both personal and 
collective.”191 The rules set up by devout Muslims, as with other ultra-
conservative religious sects, create conditions that stretch the boundaries of 
ingrained human nature. The result is one of frustration, and particularly in young 
Muslim men who may experience “frustration derived from older men controlling 
sex partners.”192  
Young Muslim men are left with few options, as adultery is severely 
frowned upon. The net result is that “young men do not have the freedom to 
experience romance,”193 and again the fallout from this is displaced. Stories 
abound of young girls who are stoned to death for the crime of adultery in some 
Muslim countries, even if the “crime” is a result of their own rape. By way of 
example, in a 2012 attack on a resort hotel outside of Kabul, Afghanistan, 
Taliban gunmen sought to terrorize and kill as many of the hundreds of guests as 
possible, primarily because the hotel was known to promote drinking and 
190 Seth G. Jones. Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of al Qa’ida since 9/11, 40. 
191 Moghaddam. From the Terrorists’ Point of View, 45. 
192 Ibid., 92. 
193 Ibid., 91. 
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adulterous liaisons. Upon bursting into the lobby on their murderous rampage, 
the gunmen’s very first question was, “Where are the prostitutes?”194 signifying 
the same kind of displaced aggression that is posed in attacks on Americans. 
Ironically, some of the same conditions that create the sense of 
dissatisfaction in young Muslims drive many of them deeper into the radical end 
of the faith. “Fundamentalist Islam is on the rise in large part because it is the 
only movement and ideology being given room to offer a solution to the identity 
crisis being experienced by Islamic communities.”195 As a result, “individuals’ 
sense of relative deprivation, particularly stemming from humiliation, may be 
“alleviated by an embracement of radical Islam, seen as a ‘way to restore their 
dignity, gain a sense of spiritual calling, and promote their values.’”196  
Jenkins, in summarizing the importance of “Knowing Our Enemy,” writes, 
“We cannot formulate multidimensional responses to terrorism that combine 
physical destruction with political warfare if we do not see our adversaries as 
anything other than comic-book villains.”197 Moghaddam and others have done 
the legwork at understanding those who would do us harm. The next component 
with respect to formulating deterrence strategies is more tactical. 
2. What Do They Want? 
Terror is just as much an enemy as the terrorists who try to create 
it. Our reactions to terrorism are part of any assessment.198 
Understanding what individuals and terror organizations hope to gain by 
acts of terrorism is just as important as knowing what provokes them to act when 
it comes to offering deterrence strategy. “At a more strategic level, we should be 
194 Habib Zahori Nordland and Alissa J. Rubin, “Witnesses Describe Brazen Attack on 
Resort Hotel Near Kabul,” New York Times, June 22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/ 
world/asia/26-die-as-afghan-forces-fight-taliban-at-hotel.html?pagewanted=all. 
195 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View, 145. 
196 Arie W. Kruglanski and Shira Fishman, “The Psychology of Terrorism: ‘‘Syndrome’’ 
Versus ‘‘Tool’’ Perspectives,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18 (2006): 197.  
197 Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation, 53. 
198 Ibid., 197. 
 56 
                                            
able to deter by undermining the terrorists’ motivation.”199 In fact, the information 
might prove to be of greater use considering the consistency with the “garbage 
out” portion of what makes the terrorist tick, in contrast to the multivariate 
psychological forces, which would fluctuate more on individual bases, even within 
groups of likeminded fanatics.200 In this realm, “deterrence strategies must 
convince the attacker that if they execute a certain (course of action), it will yield 
benefits less than those yielded by their best course of action without deterrence. 
Hence, these strategies must account for our attackers’ goals as well as our own, 
as long as we can influence their perspective on attaining their goals.”201 
These methods of deterrence by denial are directly tied to the acts, rather 
than the actors. It is because we know that terrorists are by and large rational 
actors, that we further know they highly desire success in their decided act of 
terror. “Terrorists are engaged in a high-risk venture and must constantly 
exercise caution. Even suicide terrorists, who generally hope to conduct 
significant attacks, would most likely not carelessly or recklessly squander their 
lives on an attack that had little chance of success.”202 If some factor threatens to 
impede the success of the act (denial) it may very well be scuttled for the time—
and perhaps altogether. This is as true for the suicide bomber (maybe more so) 
as it is for the leader, albeit possibly for slightly different reasons. Terror, as 
manifested today, seeks fear, which is instilled by carnage, carefully timed and 
located, so that the media may carry the message most effectively.  
Based on these knowns, denial strategy can be applied to terrorist goals in 
three broad areas: tactical success of the plot/act, psychological success of 
instilling fear, and success in exposure of message—primarily via media. Our CT 
199 Anthony, “Deterrence and the 9–11 Terrorists,” 1. 
200 Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist.” 
201 Taquechel and Lewis, “How to Quantify Deterrence and Reduce Critical Infrastructure 
Risk,” 2. 
202 Anthony, “Deterrence and the 9–11 Terrorists,” 1. 
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strategies have addressed all of these components, but not often in the name of 
deterrence. 
a. Desire for Success 
“Given the value that terrorists place on operational success, states can 
deter terrorism by convincing terrorists that operations are likely to fail. For this 
reason, simple homeland security measures can deter terrorist attacks.”203 
Clearly, the earliest (post-9/11) and most visible CT steps of the three denial 
mechanisms have been toward negating tactical success of acts of terror. These 
will continue to be at center of CT strategies. However, “it is, of course 
impossible to protect every conceivable target,”204 so additional measures might 
well be taken with the other components of denial strategy. 
b. Messaging 
The media plays an extremely important role in modern terrorism. 
Deterrence denial strategies can be greatly reinforced by media restraint or 
influence. Of course, this is a tricky area, as freedom of the press is widely 
cherished in our nation. “It is not that the media are unaware of the problematic 
power of visuals. They just cannot help themselves, given motivations arising out 
of production and commercial imperatives.”205 
Still, thought-out measures of cooperation might go a long way toward 
securing against terrorism, and the media demonstrated its willingness and ability 
to be responsible in the days and months after 9/11.206 Kroenig and Pavel point 
to a “voluntary private-public partnership” in Israel whereby the media agrees to 
“limit the amount of coverage they devote to each terrorist attack, attempting to 
203 Kroenig and Pavel, “How to Deter Terrorism,” 29. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. 
Foreign Policy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 104–105. 
206 Entman, Projections of Power. 
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balance the public’s right to know with the government’s efforts to combat 
terrorism.”207 
3. Role in/Relation to Organization 
Another way to break down the deterrable threat is to look at where the 
actors fall in the organizational spectrum. As stated above, the United States has 
experience in deterrence policy toward state-level adversaries. The critical 
component to this strategy, other than the actual (or perceived) ability to carry 
through with the threatened action, is the rationality of the enemy. The Soviet 
rulers, though they changed over time, were deemed to be rational, although 
there may have been some more questionable than others. For countries, such 
as Iran or North Korea, where leadership is of uncertain rationality, deterrence 
policy can still be enacted, such as sanctioning, but this too can be tricky.  
As we move down to the sub-state and organizational level, deterrence 
options change rapidly, particularly where there is no territory or material wealth 
to hold threat over, nor political system to work through by way of diplomacy. 
Even more difficult might be the group or cell level, and down to the individual. 
However, each of these still offers opportunities for persuasion, if enough is 
known about the actors, and if the deterrent message is effectively carried to 
them. In addition, policy aimed at individuals can be applied to parts or wholes of 
groups and organizations or vice versa, depending on what circumstances 
warrant. 
Terror experts have come up with organizational charts, which break down 
individuals roles within the structure of the group. These positions are sometimes 
fluid, as persons may move up the ranks, or perform various tasks over time. 
Some roles are likely to remain unchanged, however, such as financier or radical 
preacher. Moreover, in the case of lone wolves, or small, independent, self-
radicalized cells (such as the Fort Dix plotters), individuals may take on several 
roles. Understanding where terror actors fall in the organizational structure, 
207 Kroenig and Pavel, “How to Deter Terrorism,” 31. 
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particularly on intelligence “left of boom,” is useful in designing a program of 
deterrence targeted at the individual level. 
Many authors have demonstrated the increasing disaggregation or 
decentralization of terrorist organizations, particularly since 9/11. This may inform 
a shift in the approach to counterterrorism. “If there are multiple individuals in the 
political system capable of making and executing the decisions we seek to 
influence, our deterrence strategy will need to have multiple focal points and 
employ multiple means of communicating a complex set of deterrence messages 
that in turn take into account the multiplicity of decision makers.”208 
Davis and Jenkins recognized a decade ago: “It is a mistake to think of 
influencing al Qaeda as though it were a single entity; rather, the targets of U.S. 
influence are the many elements of the al Qaeda system, which comprises 
leaders, lieutenants, financiers, logisticians and other facilitators, foot soldiers, 
recruiters, supporting population segments, and religious or otherwise ideological 
figures.”209 The cumulative study of the radical Islamic terror adversary has 
revealed these organizational profiles, which terror experts have illustrated. See 
Figure 1. 
 
208 Chilton and Weaver, “Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,” 33. 
209 Davis and Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism, xi. 
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Figure 1.  Roles and Types within Terrorist Hierarchies210 
Moghaddam offers a detailed breakdown of “Specialized Terrorist Roles” 
in From the Terrorist Point of View. These delineations are similar to that of 
others, with more areas of overlap than divergence.  




• cell manager 
• local agitator and guide 
• local cell member 
• fodder 
• fund-raiser 
210 Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist,” 6. 
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Although it is clear as to where in the hierarchy suicide bombers fall (hint: 
not toward the top), they offer an exceptional case in the cast. Moghaddam lists 
them separately as the “poor army’s guided missiles.”211 And while suicide 
bombers have been strikingly absent from the landscape of American soil since 
9/11, they continue to haunt populations in dozens of countries and are of 
tremendous concern and perplexity, and must necessarily be addressed in this or 
any discussion of counterterrorism. “According to the deterrence model, 
successfully stopping a suicide attack would require either challenging the 
terrorists’ underlying motivations for the attack or undermining their confidence in 
its expected success.”212 
4. A Deterrence Framework 
The aim of deterrence is to preserve the status quo.213 
The formation of a deterrence framework has been offered by several 
authors. While the literature review demonstrated general consensus, but various 
shadings on methods, Chilton and Weaver offer a useful and theoretically sound, 
but tentatively implemented foundation for this structure:  
Our deterrence activities must focus on convincing competitors that 
if they attack our vital interests, they will be denied the benefits they 
seek and will incur costs they find intolerable. It also emphasizes 
encouraging continued restraint by convincing them that such 
restraint will result in a more acceptable—though not necessarily 
favorable—outcome. The concept itself is fairly simple, but its 
implementation in a complex, uncertain, and continuously changing 
security environment is not.214  
A key to the idea of “a more acceptable outcome” due to restraint comes 
through U.S. credibility in restraint of its own. Enemies and allies alike must 
believe that the restraint from terror attacks against U.S. interests will be 
211 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View, 123. 
212 Anthony, “Deterrence and the 9–11 Terrorists,” 9. 
213 Bowen, “Deterrence and Asymmetry,” 58. 
214 Chilton and Weaver, “Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,” 34. 
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complimented with likewise non-aggression or benevolence. Chilton and Weaver 
cite for example, “to deter Saddam Hussein from ordering the use of WMD during 
Operation Desert Storm in the first Gulf War, the United States issued a threat of 
devastating retaliation but also made clear that the coalition’s war aim was 
limited to the liberation of Kuwait. 
By knowing and understanding the influences on terrorists motivations as 
well as their needs and goals in committing acts of terror—and we have 
accumulated a wealth of knowledge in our collective efforts—we are offered 
opportunities to intervene through the strategy of deterrence. Both kinetic and 
non-kinetic forms of deterrence are available, and the spectrum should be 
considered and employed as appropriate.  
a. Deterrence Spectrum 
Davis and Jenkins developed an inventory early in the war on terror, which 
offers the general spectrum of deterrence measures giving us a (still) useful 
framework from which to work, see Figure 2. 
 
Deter next time by crushing now 
Deter next time by defeating now 
Deter next time by punishing now 
Deter by denial (defeat the attacks) 
Deter by increasing risks and disruption 







Figure 2.  Davis and Jenkins’s list of deterrence measures in the war on 
terror215 
Crushing, defeating, and punishing are violent responses, as indicated by 
the arrow. To what extent these deterrents have been employed by the United 







                                            
States might at first glance be deceptive. Certainly, we would equate these to 
military actions, whether invading forces, drone strikes, or special forces’ surgical 
strikes.216 We have seen all of these used since 9/11, to varying, but generally 
high degrees of success. Prior to 9/11, we had the lone punishment enacted was 
retaliatory air strikes in response to the African embassy bombings. No other 
retaliation was taken for any of the major terror attacks previously listed—Beirut, 
1993 World Trade Center, Mogadishu, Khobar Towers, USS Cole. Using this one 
pre-9/11 example that would fit, then, we would categorize it as “deter next time 
by punishing” and judge it to be ineffective, based on the reaction at the time.  
As we will discuss, there are appropriate times for the use of these levels 
of deterrent. We can extrapolate from the threat of nuclear strike against a Soviet 
nuclear launch to illustrate, however. Any large-scale terror strike or the use of 
any WMD would constitute appropriate use of the punish/defeat/crush retaliatory 
deterrence, although the upper most level would call for extreme circumstances. 
Deter by denial (defeat the attacks) and deter by increasing risks and 
disruption are shades of a similar strategy. These are promising and stem from 
the understanding of “what is hoped to be derived from committing acts of 
terrorism,” as discussed above. “Kroenig argued that terrorists value operational 
success, personal glory, their reputation and honor, and their support in the 
broader Muslim population.”217 
In many ways, these are the preparedness, intelligence gathering and 
sharing, and target hardening initiatives that have been in full swing in the 
homeland since 9/11. Yet there is still much hope and promise in this quarter. 
While we are facing the stark reality that funds are not unlimited toward these 
protective measures,218 there may be ways that policy can pick up the slack. 
Carnage, fear, timing, location, media, and message are all components of 
216 May 1, 2010, for example. 
217 Schmitt and Shanker, Counterstrike, 51–52. 
218 John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, 
Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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success in terrorism. Mitigating some or even one of these for any given attack 
would constitute at least partial defeat. Despite the after-attack rhetoric, terrorists 
are cautious and deliberate in planning attacks precisely because they so highly 
desire full success for their efforts. Anything less constitutes a deterrent. 
Deter by threat, along with the denial and disruption discussed above, is 
central to this thesis exploration. To this stratum, we will lump in dissuade, which 
is a softer form of the idea of threat. The authors of the framework (Davis and 
Jenkins), inserted the interrogative Hold at risk what is dear to our enemies? 
directly into the graphic next to Deter by threat. Without reading too much into 
this, we can fairly say that we both did not know as much about what that “dear 
to” consisted of at the time of the paper’s publication (2003) as we do now, and 
that conditions have evolved so much from that point of post 9/11 haze to now, 
that the time may be ripe to further explore this. Just as denial and disruption 
connect back to what we know about the desires for the effect of terrorist acts, 
threat-by-holding-at-risk-what-is-dear, and dissuasion, can be derived from the 
knowledge we draw out from the other side of what makes them tick: the 
psychological profiles. 
Finally, we have persuade, induce positively, and co-opt, the gentlest 
forms of deterrence. These would be most appropriate for those at the lowest 
level of the staircase to terrorism; people who may sense injustice or other of the 
psychological impetus for potentially moving toward a path of terrorism. There is 
some evidence, based on terrorism database analyses, that “positive feedback” 
may be more effective than “negative feedback” when seeking to influence 
terrorists.219 The Department of Defense Deterrence Operations Joint Operating 
Concept, like the Chilton and Weaver citation above, identified “encouraging 




                                            
restraint by making seem more attractive than action,” as a third form of 
deterrence, in addition to “imposing costs” and “denying perceived benefits.”220  
These methods are appropriate for those in groups, which encompass 
larger numbers of people, particularly the frustrated youth, unlike the higher 
levels on the staircase. They pose little immediate threat, but are threatened 
themselves of eventual indoctrination. Moghaddam instructs us, “the young in 
Islamic communities have been experiencing a deep identity crisis.”221 Young 
people may be touched by many outreach programs.  
More thought and energy should be put into this end of the scale, 
however, as we are looking for long-term answers. For the purposes of this 
study, these forms of deterrence are only referenced, and not examined like 
some of the others. In the United States, forms of community outreach might act 
toward these forms of deterrence. 
b. Summary of Violent Islamic Extremist General Profiles 
The construct of deterrence is based on psychological influences. 
Understanding of such influences is crucial for deterrence to be effective. This 
section presented some of the psychological findings regarding violent Islamic 
extremists as well as generalized roles in the organization, which were discussed 
in regard to potential analysis toward tailored deterrence. Additionally, a 
framework was presented by which such attributes could be calculated toward 
deterrence policy. The roles in organization and deterrence framework will be 
used together, with the psychology background in the Analysis chapter for 
calculation in a matrix. Additionally, the following section will offer related data 
toward an appreciative inquiry into the topic to allow for a broadly discerned 
analysis. 
220 Taquechel and Lewis, “How to Quantify Deterrence and Reduce Critical Infrastructure 
Risk,” 3. 
221 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View, 37. 
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B. CONFLICTS FOR COMPARISON 
1. WWII, Cold War 
Prior to holding the threat of mutually assured destruction through atomic 
annihilation over the Soviets throughout the Cold War, the United States 
demonstrated its capability and willingness to model deterrence by dropping 
nuclear bombs over two Japanese cities. Rather than a win based on eliminating 
strategic targets that would inhibit the Japanese from continuing to conduct the 
war effort, the bombs sapped the will of headstrong leaders, who saw the 
prudence in surrendering rather than risk another bomb or bombs being dropped 
over additional cities.  
The scale of the physical threat from Japan was in polar opposition to the 
current asymmetric war we currently face. Yet some comparisons are inevitable. 
Not since 1941 have we suffered a foreign attack of that magnitude on our 
nation. Not since WWII have suicide operatives been so instrumental and 
influential in the conduct of attacks. Moreover, not since that time have the 
circumstances impact fears of a segment of American society and corresponding 
infringements on liberties. 
The Cold War is the most notable example of effective deterrence strategy 
in U.S. history. It differs substantially from the war on terror because of the state 
versus asymmetric contest, as with WWII Japan, and due to the capability to 
focus majority of resources at solitary enemy, rather than a dispersed and elusive 
one. Elaine Bunn summarizes, “During the Cold War, the United States spent 
enormous amounts of time, energy, resources, and effort trying to understand 
how the Soviets thought and what might deter them.”222 How unreasonable 
would it be to replace “Cold War” with “War on Terror” and “Soviets” with “al 
Qaeda” in this statement? 
Many of the authors vetted in the literature review both noted the 
significance of the Cold War template and the distinguishing features of the 
222 Bunn, “Can Deterrence be Tailored?” 3. 
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application of deterrence towards the terrorist threat. However, despite the 
recognition of the distinctions and the desire to move the conversation forward, 
several of these authors fell back to U.S. nuclear deterrence in their strategy 
analyses with reference to WMD and/or current and future state threats.223 
Even the potential for nuclear deterrence for state adversaries or state 
sponsors of WMD does not equate to the Cold War experience. The Soviet 
Union, as a superpower was a true peer, whereas today we plan for “near-peer” 
at best,224 and down from there. The updated views are informative toward state 
level deterrence strategy, which is currently a concern toward North Korea and 
the potential for a nuclear Iran.  
Whereas the 2010 National Security Strategy references the U.S. 
maintenance of a nuclear arsenal “to deter potential adversaries and to assure 
U.S. allies,”225 when these two countries are singled out in the document, the 
rebuke detours from the major deterrence with additional intermediate measures: 
“If they ignore their international obligations, we will pursue multiple means to 
increase their isolation and bring them into compliance with international 
nonproliferation norms.”226 One danger here is of signaling inconsistencies or 
lack of credibility, which has been shown to be crucial to deterrence strategy. 
Analysis of the WWII and Cold War deterrence strategies were the 
substance of a Naval Postgraduate School Master’s Thesis by Eric F. 
Taquechel.227 His conclusions were that in addition to “mutual perceptions—‘self-
image and the image of the enemy’—adversary risk propensities and domains 
arguably influence the outcome of deterrence.”228 He determined that “the risk 
223 Elbridge A. Colby, “Restoring Deterrence,” Orbis 51, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 413–428. 
224 Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation. 
225 White House Office, National Security Strategy, 23. 
226 Ibid., 24. 
227 Eric F. Taquechel, “Validation of Rational Deterrence Theory: Analysis of U.S. 
Government and Adversary Risk Propensity and Relative Emphasis on Gain or Loss” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010). 
228 Ibid., 167. 
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profile of a U.S. adversary against whom the United States would implement 
deterrence strategy/tactics must be analyzed in depth, with special emphasis on 
understanding risk propensity and domain.”229  
Based on the assessment that the United States “failed to deter a militarily 
and economically inferior Japan from attacking the U.S. mainland prior to U.S. 
entry into World War II; however, the U.S. successfully deterred a threat from a 
larger, more powerful nation during the Cuban Missile Crisis,”230 an important 
distinction was that “Japan was already in the domain of loss and risk prone,” 
while the USSR, “in contrast, was also risk prone but in the domain of gains.”231 
This may serve to inform in a scaled down application of deterrence, such as with 
“sources of inspiration” and other leaders, as will be discussed below. 
2. Israel and U.K. Experiences 
Israel with its extensive history of battling terrorist strategies and tactics 
has used deterrence on the asymmetrical level. As might be expected, the full 
range of deterrence strategies and tactics has been employed. At top end of the 
list have been kinetic activities taken to the adversary: “Israeli military operations 
into Palestinian territory were conducted directly in response to terrorist acts. 
These incursions brought pressure to bear on leaders of the Palestinian Authority 
and disrupted the activities of Palestinian militants.”232 One view holds that a 
‘cumulative deterrence’ through repeated victories “eventually convinced Arab 
states that they could not defeat Israel militarily.”233 
Israeli punishment strategies have relied heavily on targeted killings, but 
have also included the practice of leveling the family house of terrorists, 
229 Taquechel, “Validation of Rational Deterrence Theory,” 166. 
230 Taquechel, “Validation of Rational Deterrence Theory,” 1. 
231 Ibid., 166. 
232 Garrity, Bar, and Payne, Deterrence and Coercion of Non-State Actors, 17. 
233 Knopf, “The Forth Wave in Deterrence Research,” 14. 
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particularly suicide bombers.234 Rather than profit from the act of the bomber, 
which was the practice of Hamas, the family would stand to lose. “This tactic had 
mixed success and was used by Israel for a limited time.” 
Additionally, the Israelis have dabbled in various denial tactics, which 
deeply rely on psychology. The notion of a practice of wrapping the remains of 
suicide bombers in the skins of pigs, knowing the religious aversion Muslims 
have to this animal, and the close connection between the act and the transition 
to “paradise,” has been floated,235 and even claimed to be used by some.236 The 
concept is designed to force this factor to enter bombers’ decision calculus in 
proceeding with an attack.  
At the passive end of the range, playing on psychological denial was and 
is the response of both emergency personnel and nearby citizens to attack sites. 
Scenes of blood and destruction are quickly and efficiently restored to order by 
all those in the vicinity of an attack.237 The idea is to reduce the desired benefit of 
the terror attack; to cut down on the disruption, media exposure, and fear factor. 
As discussed above, considering the goals of terrorism, this is an example of 
deterrence by denial. A Rand study of deterrence concluded that the Israelis 
takeaway lesson “was to rely more on deterrence, both by punishment and 
denial.”238 
Like Israel, the British have been countering terrorism for decades in the 
unrest distilled by the various factions and offshoots of the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) in Northern Ireland and in England. As with traditional forms of crime, the 
jailing of terrorists up the organizational chain was a common attempt at 
234 Garrity, Bar, and Payne, Deterrence and Coercion of Non-State Actors. 
235 “Burial Plan to Deter Suicide Bombs,” CNN.com World, August 21, 2011, http://europe. 
cnn.com/2001/WORLD/meast/08/20/suicide.bombers/index.html. 
236 Alan Philips, “Settlers Use Pigskin to Foil the Martyrs,” The Telegraph, February 26, 
2002, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/1386104/Settlers-use-
pigskin-to-foil-the-martyrs.html. 
237 Robert Wiener, “Israelis Share Expertise in Responding to Terror,” New Jersey Jewish 
News, July 23, 2009, http://njjewishnews.com/njjn.com/072309/njIsraelisShareExpertise.html. 
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deterrence. Early efforts at denial strategy came as the British Ministry of 
Defence’s engineers developed “a system of electronic countermeasures and 
jamming techniques for the Army that effectively thwarted” the IRA’s 
development of remote controlled bomb detonators in the 1970s.239 
The British, both in their ‘counter-atrocities’ against the IRA and 
their strategic bombing of civilians in Mesopotamia, demonstrated 
that democracies can at times impose very brutal measures. These 
punitive strategies produced some success in changing NSA 
behavior, but ultimately turned elite opinion in Britain against 
London policies.240  
Much can be garnered from the Israeli and British experiences. However, 
what differs from the current threat faced by the United States is that both of 
those nations have been fighting an adversary that is generally cohesive, rather 
than the al Qaeda ideology, which morphs and spreads via more complex ideas, 
ideals, and networked cells. Also, although Hezbollah has long used suicide 
tactics and acts in the name of Islam, the nature of the struggle is one of Ethno-
nationalist territory dispute. Sri Lanka also experienced this in a long deadly 
struggle against the Tamil Tigers. Each of these movements operates from a 
different set of ideals and motivations than the current radical Islamic threat 
against the west and the United States. Thus, while learning may take place by 
what worked and did not work in deterrence strategy, the application to the 
current asymmetrical threat must be tailored accordingly. 
3. Contemporary Terrorism Deterrence Examples 
Just as the beginning of the Cold War did not create the utility of 
deterrence as an element of national security strategy, the end of 
the Cold War did not eliminate it.241 
239 Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism Trends and Prospects,” in Countering the New Terrorism, ed. 
Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini and Brian Michael 
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The current U.S. practice of drone strikes on terror leaders in Yemen, 
Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan is generally geared towards hard-core terrorist 
operatives. This is a form of deterrence, appropriate for those in that level of the 
organization. It is also generally agreed to be the case that few other deterrence 
options are available for leaders, particularly in overseas places where no other 
forms of influence can be brought to bear on them, and the cost/benefit of 
apprehension attempts are too high. The 2006 National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism make clear that the “hard core among our terrorist enemies cannot be 
reformed or deterred; they will be tracked down, captured, or killed.”242 
Whether this is an effective deterrent from the business of terrorism is 
debatable. Once reaching this level in the organizational structure, it is believed 
there is little to dissuade these individuals from continuing their acts. Each of 
them, to a man, would profess his desire to die for his cause. Nevertheless, the 
strategy is seen as effective from the standpoint of decapitating, which might be 
viewed as “deter by crushing” on an individual level. One drawback, however, 
may be that the collateral damage spawns further terrorists over time.  
(1) Details Matter. Perhaps more important considerations from the 
standpoint of deterrence are the approaches to, and attendant circumstances of 
death in targeted killings. OBL’s death is a prime example of this concept. As a 
quintessential source of inspiration, bin Laden often spoke of welcoming his own 
death so long as it served Allah. In other words, he strongly desired to go out a 
martyr, as he exhorted so many others to do. Once attaining such a position, this 
rationality becomes the default outlook for a terrorist leader regarding death. In 
fact, even a lone wolf, as the leader of his own one-man jihad typically claims this 
stance. Whether OBL truly feared or welcomed death is not important. It is only 
the perception that mattered. By denying him the chance to go out in a blaze of 
glory, and disposing of his body properly,243 but privately, the United States 
242 White House Office, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 11. 
243 According to Islamic tradition. 
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effectively denied bin Laden his ultimate martyr scenario. While it is true that 
others proclaimed his martyrdom,244 his fantasy went unfulfilled. 
To translate this to deterrence, we would imagine that the next guy (further 
down the chain) might not be as anxious to ascend to OBL’s level, only to go out 
with a whimper of futility. Similarly, Anwar Awlaki’s life ended unceremoniously in 
a car hit by a massive bomb. 
Awlaki was not only the functional leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP), but a gifted orator who attracted and inspired radical jihadists 
from the Fort Dix plotters to the Fort Hood shooter. While he attained the 
“inspirational leader” status, Awlaki demonstrates the power that radical 
preachers can have. The authors of “How to Deter Terrorism,”245 illustrated how 
deterrence can reach this segment of the terrorist tree. Following the 7/7 Metro 
bombings in 2005, an enraged Tony Blair threatened to pass a law that would 
call for jailing of radical preachers in British mosques. These words alone caused 
many of the most radical imams to either change the tone of their sermonizing, or 
pack up and move their inciting speech to other countries. The lesson to be taken 
is that the clerics enjoy their lifestyle and freedom, making imprisonment a very 
effective deterrent for those playing this role in the organization. 
4. 9/11, Madrid, London, Pre-9/11 
The 9/11 attacks redefined plausibility. Scenarios previously 
dismissed as far-fetched became operative presumptions.246 
September 11 was a spectacular success in the eyes of the perpetrators 
of the attacks, as well as all their enthusiasts and likeminded radicals. Weeks 
later, we were shown an image of OBL smiling at the video footage of the towers 
collapsing. Even with the operational failure of the plane taken down in 
244 What else could they say? 
245 Kroenig and Pavel, “How to Deter Terrorism,” 31. 
246 Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation, 11. 
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Shanksville, PA, which ordinarily would have been a devastating failure, the 
attacks were of epic accomplishment. However, was it complete? 
What were the psychological effects of the stories of regular Americans 
overpowering the hijackers of flight 93 and inhibiting the plane from reaching its 
intended target? What about the unimagined heartiness of the Pentagon building, 
which barely sustained any visible damage beyond the point of impact of the 
plane?247 And what did all the tales of heroism from the World Trade Center 
attack, and the constant images and laudation of firefighters and others on “the 
pile” doing a much heralded job of clean-up and recovery do to the feeling of 
success of mission? Each of these, if so perceived, constitutes a denial of 
success, which amount to deterrence.  
(1) Hard Lessons. Can we take these lessons learned in pain and 
sacrifice, and translate them to a policy that can sustain us through an uncertain 
future? Kroenig and Pavel maintain that the U.S.’s proclamation that it will shoot 
down hijacked airplanes following the attacks of September 11, “might already 
have deterred 9/11-style attacks.”248 As evidence, they cite the change over to 
shoe/underwear/package bombing attempts as opposed to suicide hijackings. 
The lesson from the 2004 Madrid train bombings was unambiguous. The 
carnage of March 11 directly affected the country’s presidential elections, which 
were scheduled for, and held, three days later. The Socialist candidate, Jose Luis 
Rodriguez Zapatero, who trailed in the polls, won by a margin of victory that 
after-polling revealed was achieved by a percentage of voters that changed their 
minds because of the bombings. The al Qaeda terrorists not only achieved 
success in the attack, but got a direct victory when the incoming president 
withdrew Spain’s troops from Afghanistan.249 Beyond that, the victory was highly 
247 “Hunt the Boeing,” Snopes.com, last updated April 8, 2008. http://www.snopes.com/ 
rumors/pentagon.asp. 
248 Kroenig and Pavel, “How to Deter Terrorism,” 30. 
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symbolic as Spain is well known as the previous far point of the Islamic caliphate 
at its height.250 
The 7/7 bombings of the London Metro one year later held different results 
than Madrid. Though almost equally successful in terms of the number of 
separate, near-simultaneous bombings, if not in deaths and injuries, the impact 
was not the same. Clearly, it was a devastating attack on the city and country, 
but the pay-off in terror did not equate. One dramatic difference was that three of 
the four bombings occurred underground—as planned. By an operational fluke, 
the final suicide bomber blew himself up aboard a double-decker bus. The 
greatest media images, a vital component of the terror goals, were of this final 
street scene. The only images to be garnered from the tube bombings were at 
entrances, which were less spectacular. 
(2) Lessons of Past Attacks. A review of the major terror attacks on 
U.S. interests prior to 9/11 is also worth assessing in the context of outcomes, so 
that some points about payoff might be inferred for use towards deterrence.  
 
Terror attack Result Payoff 
Beirut  U.S. Withdrawal Success, emboldened 
Mogadishu  U.S. Withdrawal Success, emboldened 
1993 WTC Arrests Partial success, no deterrence 
Khobar Towers  No action Success, emboldened 
Kenya/Tanzania Targeted Air Strikes No deterrence 
USS Cole No action Success, emboldened 
 
Taken together, U.S. action, or inaction, failed to measure up to any form 
of deterrence following these attacks. In fact, to listen to OBL or others, the 
terrorists were in fact emboldened following each of these. “Bin Laden, himself, 
made reference to the withdrawal of the U.S. Marines from Beirut in 1983 after 
250 See for example, Moghaddam’s discussion of “living-history cultures” in From the 
Terrorists’ Point of View.  
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the Marine Corps barracks were struck by a Hizbullah suicide truck-bomb. He 
also noted a second American retreat in the case of Somalia in 1993.”251 The 
2006 National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism proclaims, “the terrorists are 
emboldened more by perceptions of weakness than by demonstrations of 
resolve. Terrorists lure recruits by telling them that we are decadent, easily 
intimidated, and will retreat if attacked.”252 According to Gerald Steinberg, “the 
growth in ambitions of the new global terrorism, like that of bin Laden, can be 
directly tied to the erosion of Western (and even Russian) deterrence as 
perceived by militant Islamists over the last two decades.”253 
(3) Summary of Past Attacks. In summary, we may derive three 
lessons from these attacks and the responses to them. First, deterrence 
strategies can and should be specifically tailored to an individual’s role within the 
organization. Targeted killing is appropriate for leaders, and should be done in a 
way to minimize the martyrdom effect. Other strategies are more appropriate for 
others down the chain, such as threatened imprisonment or loss of assets for 
radical preachers or financiers, whose lifestyle is important to them. The leader 
or the suicide bomber, by contrast, would not likely be persuaded in this way. 
The second lesson here is that both capitulation and non-action are likely 
to amount to the opposite of deterrence. Whether withdrawing troops or changing 
the choice of a political candidate, capitulation acts as a catalyst to further 
terrorism, and in the hands of a skilled speaker, inaction can have just as great 
an effect. 
Moreover, the final lesson is that deterrence by denial is effective. The 
mere act of draping a sheet over a hole made by a bomb, reducing imagery of 
destruction and carnage, or displaying resiliency and spirit as a people effectively 
denies terrorists the full impact of their investment into the attack. As one of the 
251 Gerald M. Steinberg, “Rediscovering Deterrence After September 11, 2001,” Jerusalem 
Letter/Viewpoints, no. 467 (December 2001): 3. 
252 White House Office, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. 
253 Steinberg, “Rediscovering Deterrence After September 11, 2001,” 3. 
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less aggressive and more cost-effective prospects, this strategy should be more 
vigorously investigated and pursued. 
5. Other Examples: Crime, Gangs, Graffiti 
Associations made between crime deterrence and terrorism deterrence 
must be carefully considered, because by and large, terrorists are not motivated 
or influenced by the same things as criminals. “Criminal deterrence puts cops on 
the street and bars over windows—and prisons in our communities—to force 
potential lawbreakers to weigh costs and benefits before deciding whether or not 
to engage in illegal activity.”254  
Yet, there are some useful corollaries. The 2003 study of the “Deterrence 
and the 9-11 Terrorists” assessed much of the data based on extensive 
knowledge of drug smugglers’ points of reaction in light of deterrence strategies. 
There are some strong relational qualities between drug cartels and terror groups 
(and many of these have strengthened in recent years).255 There have been 
some grassroots efforts to make connections between terrorism and gangs and 
narco-gangs, in the hopes of developing solutions. There are many similarities 
when it comes to organizational structure and tactical maneuvering. However, 
the motivations and sensibilities of drug smugglers and religiously inspired 
suicide bombers are not likely consistent.  
START’s256 Erica Chenowith points out that, “Strategies that successfully 
deter common criminals may be ineffective for terrorists…because terrorists are 
generally less concerned about being punished and more concerned about their 
role in ensuring the well-being of their movement and its constituency.”257 While 
this is likely true for the hardcore, it is a blanket statement of “terrorists.” As we 
254 Schmitt and Shanker, Counterstrike, 5. 
255 Michael Braun, “Drug Trafficking and Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups: A Growing 
Nexus?” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch #1392, July 25, 2008, 
http://www.eisf.eu/resources/library/DrugTraffickingMiddleeastTerrorGroups.pdf. 
256 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. 
257 Eveleth, “Can Science Stop Terrorists Before They Strike?”  
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shall see, there are actors within the system of terrorism that may well be 
concerned about punishment, and that what constitutes punishment may also 
vary from the typical incarceration meted out to criminals. 
a. Recruiting 
Viewed with this in mind, the comparisons can be valuable. One important 
commonality between them is the recruitment of at-risk youths. In this way, 
deterrence strategies at the lower end of the hierarchy, such as co-opting and 
dissuading might offer useful lessons. As stated earlier, these are not the core 
focus of this study, however. 
The at-risk youth segment does feed gang populations, a major force in 
criminal activity. “A recent innovation in policing that capitalizes on the growing 
evidence of the effectiveness of police deterrence strategies is the focused 
deterrence framework, often referred to as pulling levers policing. Pioneered in 
Boston as a problem-oriented policing project to halt serious gang violence 
during the 1990s, the focused deterrence framework has been applied in many 
U.S. cities through federally sponsored violence prevention programs.”258  
The “pulling levers” deterrence programs concentrate on reducing 
violence and crime associated with gangs. “The deterrence message was…a 
promise to gang members that violent behavior would evoke an immediate and 
intense response from law enforcement.”259 A review of these strategies 
determined they “can be effective in controlling specific crime problems when 
they engage in a variety of partnerships and tailor an array of tactics to address 
underlying criminogenic conditions and dynamics.”260 
258 Anthony A. Braga and David L. Weisburg, Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Strategies 
to Prevent Crime, no. 6 of Crime Prevention Research Review (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2012), 4. 
259 Ibid., 11. 
260 Ibid., 20. 
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b. Lessons of Graffiti 
Another useful comparison, often associated with gang activity, might be 
of graffiti “artists,” who are not killing anyone, but committing property crimes 
against society. For non-gang related taggers, “rather than being a senseless 
destruction of property, graffiti fulfills certain psychological needs,”261 including 
anger and hostility issues and ideological grievances, offering a viable 
comparison to the “what do they want” aspect of terrorism. The obvious 
deterrents to this crime are the same as with others: civil and criminal 
punishments, such as probation, fines, community service, and jail time. On the 
non-punitive side, however, officials have learned that rapid “removal of graffiti 
has been shown to reduce its occurrence. This approach directly addresses the 
motives of many offenders.”262 Because taggers desire the notoriety that comes 
with the visible fruits of their labor, it was learned that removing, cleaning, or 
covering the graffiti immediately, prior to sunrise if possible, would greatly 
diminish the return on investment of time and energy, and thereby act as a 
deterrent. This deterrence by denial—in this case exposure toward acclaim—is 
very similar to the Israel concept of quickly sanitizing terror attack scenes. 
c. Summary of Conflicts for Comparison 
This section surveyed the deterrence landscape ranging from World War II 
and the Cold War, to Ethno-national insurgency-based terrorism, to post-9/11 
experiences and other crime-related analogies, to offer a rich appreciative inquiry 
into the topic of this thesis. These experiences will be factored in, along with the 
topics of next section, which include the various forms of deterrence, along with 
related attributes, for deeper understanding toward the analysis. 
261 Deborah Lamm Weisel, Graffiti, Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Problem-Specific 
Guides Series no. 9 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2004), 7. 
262 Weisel, Graffiti, 20. 
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C. APPLIED TYPOLOGIES OF DETERRENCE 
1. Deterrence by Punishment 
One form of deterrence would involve the overt threat of some retaliatory 
action, should an attack against the United States, its interests, or allies take 
place. This is deterrence as it is widely perceived, such as imprisonment for 
conviction of a crime or a nuclear strike in retaliation of serious state-level 
aggression. As discussed above, one effective and well known method that has 
been imposed in the asymmetrical environment is the use of drone strikes. To 
categorize these based on the distinctions listed above, they typically target 
individuals or small groups, usually hit a leader figure, and in all cases occur in 
limited, pre-determined places abroad. Despite effectiveness, this retaliatory 
deterrence would be inappropriate should any of the parameters change: location 
of actor, size of targeted group, or perhaps role in organization.  
a. Economic Punishment 
A very different, yet powerful retaliatory measure, which has been used in 
the war against terrorism, is economic denial. The seizure or freezing of assets is 
a time-tested measure, and was strategically emplaced and carried out from the 
earliest time in the war on terror. There is evidence that just the threat of asset 
forfeiture from terror money being funneled from wealthy Saudis put a halt to that 
source of funding. It can be an effective tool at the state level, as well as for 
many actors through the terror organization, and even tangentially. For example, 
it is well known that families of suicide bombers have been paid in reward for the 
act, as has been Hezbollah policy.263 Turning this around could be a persuasive 
deterrent to a suicide bomber, who may be willing to give his life, but would still 
care about the welfare of his family. If the potential bomber believed his family 
stood to lose financially, rather than gain, he might be dissuaded from acting. 
And if the family was complicit in the act in any way, either by way of giving 
263 Don Radlauer, “Rational Choice Deterrence and Israeli Counter-Terrorism,” Institute for 
the Study of Asymmetric Conflict, accessed August 22, 2014, http://www.asymmetricconflict.org/ 
articles/rational-choice-deterrence-and-israeli-counter-terrorism/. 
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blessing, comfort, encouragement, or even passively so, the retaliatory 
deterrence might well transfer beyond the organization to them. 
b. Punishing Suicide Bombers 
Another retaliatory measure that might be taken against a would-be 
suicide bomber would be pre-instilling some psychological pain in response to 
the murderous act. Psychologists have told us that perceived shame is an 
overriding cause of anger among the Muslim world. The sense of shame is tied 
to American foreign policy, rightly or wrongly, and pushes some up the staircase 
of terrorism. While many worldly effects might lose their meaning to a young man 
preparing for a suicide mission, the belief that the act would bring shame upon 
him and his family might be more than he would be willing to bear. In fact, as with 
kamikazes, suicide bombers are taught to believe that their act is honorable and 
will cause them to be heralded. Efficacy in this may only be a matter of figuring a 
way to impose that shame, connected to the act, and making the retaliatory 
intention well known.  
Undoubtedly, the suicide terrorist presents one of the most confounding 
problems to U.S. CT efforts, as well as the many nations that are at risk from 
fundamentalist Islamic terrorism. Where deterrence seems like a less than viable 
option, it is vitally important to discover the ways that it can be used based on the 
difficulties in countering this threat, and apparently deep pool of willing 
candidates.  
2. Deterrence by Denial 
Denying benefits may be the most effective means available, 
especially if the non-state actor’s organization is small and/or well 
distributed.264 
“When considering deterrence, many analysts think solely in terms of 
deterrence-by-retaliation, but deterrence theorists also advanced a second type 
264 Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0, 66. 
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of deterrence strategy: benefit denial, or deterrence by denial, strategies, which 
contribute to deterrence by threatening to deny and adversary the benefits of a 
particular course of action.”265 The idea plays off what we know about the goals 
of terrorism, and that disrupting attacks, even to a degree, denies the enemy 
from the satisfaction of success of the act. Given the assets being invested into 
the attacks on the part of the groups and individuals, terrorists highly prize 
mission success. “The aim is to sow the seed of doubt in an opponent’s mind by 
undermining confidence in his capability to achieve the desired outcome.”266 
Citing Princeton Professor Glenn Snyder’s 1961 assertion that “a denial 
strategy may even ‘be the more powerful deterrent’ because threats to attempt to 
deny an attack are inherently more credible than threats to retaliate in response 
to an attack,”267 Kroenig and Pavel offer denial as an important prospect in 
applying deterrence to asymmetrical actors. 
The NIPP study identified several denial measures employed by states to 
deter NSAs. Broadly, they included disruption of operations, eliminating 
sanctuaries, “anti-terrorist laws, establishment of specialized response 
capabilities to counter NSA tactics (e.g., commando units for hostage rescue), 
military operations to disrupt NSA activities, and refusal to negotiate with 
NSAs.”268 U.S. CT policy has already instituted a great many measures that may 
be considered deterrence of terrorism by denial. Hardening of targets, 
preparedness, and mitigation all serve to decrease the likelihood of success of 
acts of terrorism, or soften the impact of such attacks. The 2006 National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism identifies this strategy: “While it is impossible 
to protect completely all potential targets all the time, we can deter and disrupt 
265 Kroenig and Pavel, “How to Deter Terrorism,” 23. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Kroenig and Pavel, “How to Deter Terrorism,” 23. 
268 Garrity, Bar, and Payne, Deterrence and Coercion of Non-State Actors, 14. 
 82 
                                            
attacks…through strategic security improvements at sites both at home and 
overseas.”269 
a. Threat to Success 
Armed with the knowledge that “the terrorist actors themselves are often 
concerned about operational risk—they may be willing to risk or give their lives, 
but not in futile attacks,”270 many manifestations of denial may be enacted to 
discourage individual attacks, which would ideally then have a cumulative effect. 
Shift of time and place for example, may gradually decrease attempts, viewed as 
not being worthwhile. That is, terrorists set their sights on a particular location 
and/or time of attack. If they are unable to act as they desire, they may either 
abandon the effort or find it less than satisfactory after the fact, and be less 
inclined to act the next time when their chosen time and venue are inaccessible. 
“Thus, better defensive measures can help to deter or deflect, even if they are 
decidedly imperfect.”271 
A related strategy might be employed to dissuade suicide bombers by 
denial. Similar to the development of interrupters of remote detonators, 
developed by the British to overcome technological advancement of IRA 
terrorists in the early 1970s, a technical remedy developed to disrupt the 
explosive vest and made known would give pause to those endeavoring in these 
operations. Currently, if sensing detection, the suicide bomber merely detonates 
on the spot to inflict the greatest damage before being isolated. This scenario 
does not offer a deterrent, because the likelihood and cost/benefit are weighed 
against success. Once the bomber blows himself to bits and pieces, he no longer 
has the need or opportunity to evaluate his choice. The alternative of being taken 
alive and humiliated is rarely experienced, and therefore not of concern. 
However, if a tool is developed that could disrupt a detonator from a distance, the 
269 White House Office, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 13. 
270 Davis and Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism, 16. 
271 Davis and Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism, 16. 
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bomber would then be faced with the prospect of being disarmed before he 
knows is aware of the intervention, or at least at a point too late, and being left 
alive to be arrested and live with the consequences of his failed attempt. 
b. Psychological Deterrence 
Other forms of denial have less to do with the tactical success of an 
attack, and focus more on the psychological impacts. Some deterrence theorists 
have suggested religious refutation of the rewards of terror attacks as a strong 
persuasive deterrence by denial. A core belief in radical Islamic terrorism is the 
sanctioning of the act and awaiting rewards by Allah. Influential Muslim clerics 
with strong voices opposing the radical preachers whose sermons and fatwas 
hold such sway would be a substantial counter and a firm form of deterrence by 
denial. Implementation of this strategy remains elusive, but there are 
encouraging signs.  
The Israel model of denial based on swift cleansing of the scene of attack 
offers some prospective work in the area of deterrence. Simply put, the less 
impact the act of terror is seen to have, the less likely the act is to be carried out. 
There are many avenues into this form of deterrence by denial to be explored. 
The value of this method for Israelis hinges on the national acceptance and 
commitment to battle terrorism as a way of life.  
(1) Resiliency. We have not reached the point in the United States 
where the public is widely ready to engage in the displays of resiliency as civic 
duty, as seen in Israel. (The hope is that we will never need to). However, the 
latest CT strategies build off the concepts of community strength and resiliency 
as core components.272 One of the most promising, and logical steps to be taken 
in ongoing counterterrorism has been offered in the proselytizing of the concept 
of resilience over the last several years. Our leadership is coming to grips with 
the notion that, “Americans have come to hold unrealistic expectations about 
272 White House Office, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the 
United States (Washington, DC: The White House, 2011). 
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security, believing that risk can be abolished.”273 Instead, there is rational 
understanding that it will be impossible to completely and indefinitely protect the 
homeland from all terror attacks. “Some deterrence can be achieved by 
demonstrating that terrorist attacks will not bring the United States down or cause 
it to close itself down and that the nation is able to take punches, recover, and hit 
back very hard.”274 
With this in mind, the best response to “attacks that do occur” is physical 
and psychological resiliency. “States may also be able to achieve deterrent 
effects by developing and publicizing their resilience, including through adequate 
disaster planning and emergency response systems.”275 
(2) American Strong. Indeed resiliency has increasingly become a 
catchword in homeland security, and for good reason. The ideal straddles both 
proper planning, infrastructure protection and redundancy, and psychologically 
prepared citizenry. The last of these is the most difficult (but least costly) to 
institute. “States also can deter terrorism by denying terrorists the ability to cause 
panic in society,”276 however, indications are that we have a long way to go in 
this area. Some of this work is evident from the overreaction to some of the 
threats and false alarms that the nation has experienced in the past decade. 
“Instead of the stoicism needed for a long fight, Americans remain vulnerable to 
overreaction. A terrorist attack of even modest scale could provoke paroxysms of 
panic.”277 A strong partner in this, for better or worse, is media. 
Thus, there may be ways of tweaking actions of responders and 
responding media to influence scenes of terror attacks. To illustrate, we can use 
an extreme example based on 9/11. If, for instance, the only images to come 
273 Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation. 
274 Davis and Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism, 38. 
275 Kroenig and Pavel, “How to Deter Terrorism,” 30. 
276 Ibid., 31. 
277 Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation. 
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from the World Trade Center site278 were of the rescue, recovery, and clean-up 
after the attacks, and not the planes flying into buildings, terrorized citizens 
fleeing up the avenues, fire victims jumping to their deaths, and buildings coming 
down, would the impact have been the same? In other words, would the terrorists 
and those of like mind on the (figurative) staircases below them have had the 
same satisfaction? If the answer is “no,” then that would comprise a deterrence 
by denial. 
3. Tailored Deterrence 
In the scrambling haste of the post-9/11 national response to homeland 
security, one of the most daunting obstacles in applying the Cold War strategy of 
deterrence to asymmetrical foes was the impossible concept of trying to influence 
countless clandestine individuals—whom were seemingly poorly understood. 
Even if terrorist were found to be rational and it could be discovered that they did 
have things “held dear,” the inescapable reality held, “If deterrence is about 
influencing the perceptions—and ultimately, the decisions and actions—of 
another party, it is logical that the requirements for deterrence will differ with each 
party that we might try to deter and may well differ in each circumstance or 
scenario.”279 
Indeed, the notion of tailoring deterrence is both the greatest innovation 
needed in the application to terrorist groups and individuals, and seemingly the 
greatest potential toll on resources. Yet, “although tailored deterrence is a new 
term, the concepts underlying it—the need to adjust deterrence to each of a wide 
range of potential opponents, actions, and situations, and a wider range of 
capabilities that contribute to deterrence—are not new and have been evolving 
for some time.”280 
278 Commonly referred to as “ground zero.” 
279 Bunn, “Can Deterrence be Tailored?” 3. 
280 Ibid., 2. 
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Even among scholars who have agreed that deterrence is a worthwhile 
pursuit, the consensus is that tailored deterrence is the way forward for the 21st 
century threat environment. Elaine Bunn further proposed in “Can Deterrence be 
Tailored?” that, “a more refined understanding of each of the actors that the 
United States is trying to deter is essential to tailored deterrence, and how to 
gather the pertinent information (from both governmental an non-governmental 
sources) and make it relevant for deterrence planning will be a challenge.”281 
Working in favor of a tailored deterrence are the unparalled investments 
that have already been made into understanding the adversary over the past 
decade, and the relative calm we are experiencing in the homeland at this time. 
Chilton and Weaver point up the importance of “peacetime (or ‘Phase 0’) 
activities” toward tailored deterrence campaigns. “Peacetime activities can make 
use of deterrent means that take time to have their desired effects or that require 
repetition to be effective. They expand the range of deterrence options at our 
disposal.”282 Additionally, if deterrence is about maintaining the status quo, 
peacetime is the logical starting point. 
In addition, as previously identified, credible communication of such 
deterrence is critical to effectiveness, particularly in times of relative calm. 
Leaders and policymakers must find ways to message deterrence, and find 
needed “mechanisms to assess how their words and actions are perceived, how 
they affect each adversary’s deterrence calculations, and how they might 
mitigate misperceptions that undermine deterrence.”283 
4. Scope of Terror 
Thus far, all of the discussion regarding the asymmetrical threat 
environment has focused on the conventional types of attacks and weapons 
used in this theater, namely explosives, firearms, and fires. The logic behind this 
281 Ibid., 7. 
282 Chilton and Weaver, “Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,” 34. 
283 Bunn, “Can Deterrence be Tailored?” 1. 
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is simply that these have been the preferred weapons of the enemy over the past 
two decades: i.e., London, Madrid, explosives; 9/11, fire, Mumbai, all three. 
Generally, the analysis here centers primarily on these typical styles of attack, 
although there are many others that we fear possible. 
Two other types of attacks worth considering, chosen not for their 
likelihood, but for the distinctiveness compared to the others are WMD and 
cyber. Of WMD, the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is 
unambiguous: “We require a range of deterrence strategies that are tailored to 
the situation and the adversary. We will make clear that terrorists and those who 
aid or sponsor a WMD attack would face the prospect of an overwhelming 
response to any use of such weapons.”284 As evidenced in the discussion of 
post-9/11 strategies above, the strength and clarity of this statement is beyond all 
other references to deterrence in the national strategies. The reasons for this are 
the separate category that WMD comprise, offering an unchallenged response 
decision, as well as the comfort zone established by the related Cold War 
deterrence policy. If we develop a spectrum of deterrence responses based on 
these types of attacks, many of the other possibilities may be extrapolated, but 
are otherwise more readily implemented. 
5. Summary of Data 
This section attempts to accrue some of the significant variables 
necessary toward constructing a tailored deterrence of violent Islamic terrorism. 
The Psychology section offered a glimpse into who they are and what may 
motivate them. The Conflicts for Comparison was an appreciative inquiry into 
related or relatable experiences, and the Applied Typologies looked at options 
and factors to be considered for such tailored deterrence. The next section 
provides the analysis of all that has been presented, using the visual aid of a 
matrix, which is constructed off the data presented here. 
284 White House Office, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 14. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. DETERRENCE CHOICE VS. INDIVIDUAL ACTOR MATRIX 
The matrix (Table 1) presents a visual portrayal of the 10 deterrence 
strategies as offered by Davis and Jenkins, contrasted by the nine distinct roles 
played in modern terror organizations as identified by psychologist Fathali 
Moggahdam.285 Each intersecting strategy and role is then scored based on the 
chance of success that a given deterrence method might have on a given actor. 
The ratings, 1–5 indicate the level of expected effectiveness, with five being 
highly effective and one representing least effective. The numbers are derived 
from the author’s interpretation of the evidence presented in section IV, which 
includes outcomes from actual terror attacks and plots, previously implemented 
deterrence strategies across the spectrum of disciplines and settings, and the 
literature on deterrence strategy, both historical, and specifically designed for the 
new asymmetrical threat environment. 
Table 1.   Visual Portrayal of the 10 Deterrence Strategies 
 Crush Defeat Punish Denial Disruption Threaten Dissuade Persuade Induce Co-opt 
Ideological 
Leader 
5 4 3 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 
Tactical 
Leader 
5 5 3 4 3 3 1 1 1 1 
Lieutenant 4 4 2 2 2 4 2 1 1 1 
Foot Soldier 3 3 2 3 3 4 3 2 1 1 
Financier 3 2 2 3 3 5 3 3 2 1 
Radical 
Preacher 
1 1 1 2 2 5 3 2 1 1 
Haven 
Provider 
5 4 4 1 1 4 4 3 2 1 
Suicide 
Bomber 
1 1 1 4 5 4 3 2 1 1 
Lone Wolf 5 5 5 5 4 3 2 1 1 1 
285 Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View. 
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B. ANALYSIS OF MATRIX 
Three patterns and one overriding instruction emerge from reviewing the 
deterrence choice/individual actor matrix. The first pattern, beginning at top left, 
is that greater kinetic deterrence, or what Davis and Jenkins term “increasing 
violence,” are rated as appropriate for those at the higher ranks of the terror 
organization. The concepts of “crushing,” “defeating,” and “punishing” gradually 
tail off in effectiveness as we range down the hierarchy of the terror organization. 
The two places these bottom out, signifying ineffectiveness, or at least serious 
doubt about effectiveness are with the Radical Preacher and Suicide Bomber.  
Taking each of these separately toward elucidation, the Radical Preacher 
has little to lose by an organization suffering military defeat, since he is promoting 
a cause or an ideology, and is not constrained to a specific warring entity. What’s 
more, these types of responses actually feed the cause of the Radical Preacher, 
as they are able to point out the injustice in them and use the violence against 
Muslims as a tool for recruiting/contributions.  
For the Suicide Bomber, as has been expressed, anything relating to fear 
of harm or death is unlikely to constitute a deterrence. If the 
crushing/defeating/punishing is directed at those in the organization that he is 
acting as a minion for, this of course may delay or completely disrupt his mission. 
However, the matrix is designed to express what deterrence strategies would 
affect individuals in an organization, and not what may impact the rest of the 
organization, from the standpoint of deterrence. Therefore, the vertical columns 
only pertain to each of the actors individually, and do not carry down through the 
organization (or matrix). 
The second pattern—which is actually two patterns—that is notable within 
the matrix results, is the progression of numbers for the Lone Wolf and the 
Suicide Bomber. For the Lone Wolf, the numbers descend in order from the 
greatest violence to the softest of deterrents. This is likely explained in that for 
the Lone Wolf, all of the roles in the organization are generally fulfilled by the sole 
 90 
individual. The only exception would likely be Radical Preacher, because many 
are radicalized through the internet and other media, and even mosques. 
Because the one person fills all the roles, those strategies that would have 
greater impact over the higher parts of an organization would have more sway, 
and the effects are cumulative. Also, as a “loner,” this individual is less likely to 
be persuaded by the softer approaches, and may hold little other than his beliefs 
of value. 
With the Suicide Bomber, we see something of a bell curve in the 
numbers. This person is not likely deterred with the hardest or softest of 
strategies. However, the high marks in the middle of the range offer great hope 
toward the enigma of deterring this actor. 
The third pattern to emerge from the matrix is the evidence of which 
deterrence strategies appear to be most promising on the whole. Mathematically, 
without regard to the actual numbers of each category of actor that may need to 
be deterred (many more Suicide Bombers than Ideological Leaders), the average 
scores were as follows: 
 
Threaten 3.5; Crush 3.1; Defeat 2.9; Denial 2.6; Disruption 2.5; Punish 2.3; 
Dissuade 2.2; Persuade 1.6; Induce 1.1; Co-opt 1.0 
 
Crush and Defeat are those things that everyone understands; the actions 
that we have been taking; the choices with some of the highest costs—both in 
terms of dollars and political capital. Along with Punish, these have a place in the 
war on terror, as discussed above. 
Dissuade stands out of the “soft power” end of the spectrum. Where 
Persuade, Induce, and Co-opt hold little value toward the terror actors listed, 
primarily because they have presumably already made the choice to pursue 
terrorism as a calling, they should be applied to vulnerable cohorts where there is 
still a chance to steer clear of this decision. “The distinction between deterrence 
and dissuasion is often confused,” according to Elaine Bunn. “While deterrence is 
focused on convincing and adversary not to undertake acts of aggression, 
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dissuasion is aimed at convincing a potential adversary not to…go down an 
undesirable path, such as acquiring, enhancing, or increasing threatening 
capabilities.”286 Application of this influence on a nuclear ambitious Iran is a clear 
example of this distinction. It is more difficult to find plausible, practical 
applications toward would-be/wanna-be terrorists, however. 
What remain are Defeat and Denial (of attack/success of attack) and 
Threaten (what is dear to our enemies). Coincidentally, these fall under the more 
recent school of thought for deterrence, especially if we look at some of the 
possibilities that are being developed to specifically target the asymmetrical 
threat. Each of these categories may be additionally scrutinized, but shy of that, it 
brings us to the overriding instruction that is evidenced by the matrix. 
Where encouraging options exist in the middle of the range of deterrence 
strategies listed, it is important to recognize that patterns are only 
generalizations. In addition, where we are dealing with highly variant 
psychological cares and concerns, based on individuals’ role in the terror group, 
the best use of a visual like this is the understanding that strategies are best 
tailored to whatever degree practical. 
C. ADDITIONAL MATRICES FOR CONSIDERATION 
Three additional matrices were considered for inclusion in the analysis of 
the data above in comparison to types of deterrence: Internal (homeland) vs. 
External act; Internal vs. External actor; Type of attack (bomb, bio, nuke, knife). 
Instead, each of these will be addressed here with explanation. 
1. Internal vs. External Act/Threat 
One of the principles of the Bush Doctrine, was that the United States 
makes no distinction between terrorist acts against us in the homeland, or those 
overseas against our interests or our allies. Whatever the fallout or reassessment 
286 Bunn, “Can Deterrence be Tailored?” 2. 
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of the doctrine on the whole, this piece of it remains intact.287 Looking backward 
from 9/11, and as expressed in review of the terror attacks as presented above, 
had the United States promoted this policy in response to the Cole, Khobar 
Towers, and Beirut bombings, circumstances may have carried out differently. 
Going forward, there is little if any reason to make distinction between 
attacks in the homeland and against us and our allies abroad. In addition, just as 
globalization increasingly contributes to the root causes of terrorism, it only 
bolsters the rationality of this view. To turn the problem around for analysis, we 
can imagine how injustices, real or exaggerated, toward Muslims in the 
homeland would be perceived by those espousing radical Islam abroad. The 
answer is self-evident.  
2. Internal vs. External Actor(s) 
In general, deterrence strategy should not be altered based on the 
physical location of a terrorist perpetrator—in the homeland or in a sovereign 
nation abroad, friendly or otherwise—or whether said actor is a U.S. citizen or 
not. To be sure, the tactic employed based on a given strategy may be altered 
based on these factors. Kinetic actions tied to the upper portion of the deterrence 
spectrum, or our ability and opportunity to disrupt, deny, or threaten them is 
highly dependent on the internal vs. external reality. Again, turning it around, 
terrorist are capable and willing to adapt to constraints imposed based on the 
laws and customs of a particular locale. When it comes to deterrence strategy, it 
should remain tied to what is decided based on individual or group identity, and 
then applied within the bounds of legal and (American) value issues. One notable 
caveat as it pertains to this question, for terrorists located in unfriendly places, it 
may be possible to focus punitive efforts toward the harboring nation—similar to 
the central theme of the Bush Doctrine. This would be especially fitting where 
WMD are involved. 
287 The 2010 National Security Strategy distinguishes in defending against al Qaeda and its 
allies (read, “radical Islamic terrorists”) attacks “especially against the U.S. homeland,” However, 
based on the logic presented in this section, and throughout the paper, no distinction is made. 
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3. Type of Attack/Plot 
The final variable considered for evaluation by matrix vis-à-vis deterrence 
strategy is type of attack or plot. Does the scope of an attack or the type of 
weaponry used make a difference in the way we approach deterrence policy,? 
The answer here is yes and no. As mentioned earlier, WMD or cyber attacks 
would constitute very different circumstances than the operating model we are 
drawing from involving traditional terror tactics. Should one of these paradigm 
changers enter the equation, the policy would rightly change in proportionality. 
There would really not be much reason to adjust strategies of deterrence. Some 
other attack methods are worthy of discussion toward the formulation of 
deterrence strategy:  
One of the stunning realities about the 9/11 attacks was that the 19 
hijackers were willing to sacrifice their lives in service to their cause. Americans 
understand sacrifice as well as anyone, but the idea of killing yourself just so you 
could kill so many others is a bit harder to comprehend. This attack vaulted the 
concept of suicide terrorist into the American psyche, and despite the lack of 
even a follow-up suicide attack on our soil since then, the suicide bomber 
continues as a conundrum for us to this day. If we are to enact CT policy, it must 
account for the suicide attack on our soil. To that end, for deterrence policy to be 
effective, it must account for this eventuality. 
Also, as was noted, radical Islamic terrorists, suicide or otherwise, 
continue to select trains and planes as targets, primarily for the potential of 
confined masses of innocent people. While other venues, such as stadiums or 
other large gathering places might make attractive targets for some of the same 
reasons, we must strongly consider these when developing deterrence models. 
In conclusion, while additional matrices counting the variables of location of act, 
location of actor, and type of attack might be illuminating, it was assessed that 
the model would not alter substantially as a result. 
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D. TESTING AND ANALYZING 
Cold War deterrence policy was a gamble. There was simply no way of 
knowing if it would work. Empirical testing of the latest wave of deterrence 
strategy is limiting also. “Instead, the work has been mainly conceptual and 
policy-oriented.”288 Employing a deterrence policy consisting of multiple variables 
of strategies and tactics based on theory may be more than most policy makers 
might be comfortable with. In addition, not only might testing be a problem, but 
analysis may prove to be just as elusive.  
Knopf also makes the case that “asymmetry has mixed implications,” and 
that while Cold War deterrence offered zero room for testing error, “one or even a 
handful of deterrence failures would not vitiate the value of deterrence. Because 
a single deterrence failure does not risk complete destruction of the country, the 
standard for evaluating deterrence has changed from the Cold War.”289 
Possibly the best way to determine if the policy is effective is generally the 
same way our CT efforts on the whole are analyzed. After all, if there has not 
been an attack, how is it evaluated whether that is a function of effective policy or 
some other variables? One way of knowing is through the insight of captured 
communications between those within the terror network, or interrogations of 
captured terrorists themselves.  
The DO JOC offers another difficulty in measuring effectiveness: “The US 
may be unable to determine what specific deterrence actions successfully 
deterred an adversary from taking a specific course of action, or even whether 
adversary restraint indicated deterrence success. This could hamper efforts to 
learn from past successes, or lead to false confidence in certain past deterrence 
actions or approaches.”290 
288 Knopf. “The Forth Wave in Deterrence Research,” 1. 
289 Ibid., 4. 
290 Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0, 25. 
 95 
                                            
As resolution, The DO JOC framework offered three broad steps to 
provide analysis of effectiveness: 
• Develop an in-depth understanding of adversaries’ decision 
calculations 
• Develop and assess tailored, adversary-specific deterrent COAs 
• Implement and monitor the impacts of tailored deterrent COAs291 
If these uncertainties are cause for hesitation in implementing strategies of 
deterrence, it may be worth asking what the cost of such a policy would be. 
Considering the fundamental component of deterrence is generally the threat of 
some action, should any kind of attack take place, or plot uncovered, the costs 
are minimal, and mostly absorbed in security measures being undertaken 
already, such as intelligence gathering. Perhaps the greatest cost to be incurred 
would be in the currency of credibility, should failure occur, rather than monetary. 
Balanced against an expensive and uncertain war on terror, the downside risks 
of deterrence strategy make it a concept worth investigating. 
E. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS 
The entire premise of the deterrence theory formulated for this paper 
hinges on the belief that we are facing an enduring threat by radical Islamic 
terrorism, and that we need to continue devoting resources to this cause, albeit, 
perhaps more economically. Although few would argue the threat no longer 
exists on any level, many have said that the threat is overblown or exaggerated. 
With this in mind, a counter-argument to this (or any) proposal toward 
counterterrorism may be that grand spending is not necessarily warranted, 
justified, or rewarded in this direction.  
John Mueller and Mark Stewart examined this issue in Terror, Security, 
and Money. They concluded after some stark analysis, that spending on 
homeland security, and specifically on counterterrorism, is grossly 
291 Department of Defense, Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0, 52. 
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disproportionate to the threat. They acknowledge that “like crime and vandalism, 
terrorism will always be a feature of life,”292 but our investment in security 
“spectacularly” fails a cost-benefit analysis. It would be difficult to counter this 
argument at this point in time. 
Using the analysis of the matrix presented above, we can begin isolate 
tailored and targeted measures toward sustainable CT practices. Zeroing in on 
denial, disruption and punishment, we find strategies that not only may be most 
efficient and effective, but economical. As offered in the Data chapter, many 
actions taken toward denial and disruption require little capital, but instead 
targeted counters based on the psychology of terrorism. Additionally, punishment 
costs are minimized as opposed to defeating and crushing, because they are 
only employed in retaliation for an attack, or some other hostile action. 
Otherwise, the primary activity revolves around credible communication of 
retaliatory intentions. 
A very different, but still critical consideration is the employment of 
deterrence strategies within the scope of “American values.” The subject of Uri 
Fisher’s paper “Deterrence, Terrorism, and American Values” focused on this 
concern. He postulated, “the requirements to deter individuals within a terrorist 
system will force policymakers to compromise some very basic and sacrosanct 
American values.”293 However, Fisher goes on to say that the best example of 
the tension is ‘targeted killings.’294 In his argument, “the lives of individuals within 
a terrorist organization represents one of the few assets that the United States 
may be able to hold at risk…”295 With the use of drone strikes, not only is that 
horse out of the barn, but one of the central propositions of this paper, and a 
feature that was born out in the analysis above, indicates that this is not the case.  
292 Mueller and Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money, 173. 
293 Fisher, “Deterrence, Terrorism, and American Values,” 10.  
294 Ibid. 
295 Ibid., 11. 
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V. STRATEGIES: UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND 
OFFSETS 
The analysis above suggests the prospect of deterrence as a strategy 
potential for the long war on terrorism. As evidenced and discussed, there have 
been innumerable strategies presented toward the war on al Qaeda, radical 
Islamic terrorism, and terrorism more broadly, and in support of homeland and 
national security. Though an evolution, to some degree, of thinking in the 
direction of deterrence of transnational terrorism has been detailed above, the 
evidentiary conclusion is that, although the concept has steadily gained 
momentum, it remains an elusive policy. 
This section seeks to elucidate further the strategy of deterrence by 
examining radical Islamic terrorist organizations in the context of “complex 
adaptive systems” and their brand of modern terrorism as a “disruptive 
technology.” Additionally, if viewed as a complex adaptive system itself, the 
homeland security enterprise should adopt befitting counter-strategies. By 
applying some of the founding concepts in these areas toward the problem of an 
enduring terror threat, we may: 
• Gain a nuanced, but objective perspective from which to approach 
the problem 
• Discover a path to appropriate solutions toward implementation 
issues.  
The end goal of this section is to reveal cogent reasoning toward 
implementing a strategy, which appropriately includes tailored deterrence. The 
game-changing realities of technological innovations will be reviewed with 
respect to use by terrorists, and then set in context toward strategy objectives. A 
summarization and synthesis of strategy routes and recommendations will be 
offered in the final chapter under “Findings, Conclusions, and 
Recommendations.” The issues of implementation of have either already 
factored in the lack of progress in creating effective deterrence policy, (and)/or 
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are likely to arise going forward. These notions will also be more completely 
fleshed out in the final chapter.  
A. DISRUPTION HARNESSED BY “THE FEW” 
In “The Power of ‘the Few:’ A key strategic Challenge for the Permanently 
Disrupted High-Tech Homeland Security Environment,” Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez 
distinguishes between the bifurcated mission of the homeland security enterprise 
in an increasingly complex environment.296 He argues that the current approach 
is generally appropriate for “an incremental or ‘systemic mission,’ but that a new 
model is needed for the “disruptive or ‘future shock mission;’” one which is “better 
adapted to confront the negative effects of disruption by fostering and harnessing 
the positive ones.”297 “The power of the few” refers to the changing paradigm 
arising as, “technology has lowered the barriers to entry for disruption.”298 
The concept of disruptive technology was popularized by Harvard 
business professor Clayton Christensen, who noted a pattern whereby solid, 
well-run companies would fold, or at least lose out substantially to upstarts who, 
because of their flexibility and lack of accountability, were able to embrace and 
run with an innovation.299 Because this new technology changed not only the 
industry it served, but other aspects of society, it was seen as “disruptive.” A few 
of the many examples would be the internal combustion automobile, atomic 
bomb, personal desktop computer, and health maintenance organization. 
Sustaining technologies, the more common kind, “improve the 
performance of established products, along the dimensions of performance that 
mainstream customers in major markets have historically valued.”300 An 
296 Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez, “The Power of ‘the Few:’ A Key Strategic Challenge for the 
Permanently Disrupted High Tech Homeland Security Environment,” Homeland Security Affairs 
Journal, 7, no. 18 (December 2011). 
297 Ibid., 2. 
298 Ibid. 
299 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause 
Great Firms to Fail (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), Kindle edition. 
300 Ibid., 24. 
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important distinction is that with this more prevalent technological advancement, 
changes occur incrementally (not necessarily slowly, though), whereby 
“disruptive innovation can and often does change the environment in unexpected 
ways, disrupting the rules that governed what seemed, for a while, a stable 
ecosystem.”301 The other keys to this, which will be explored further in the 
closing of this chapter, are the influences of “mainstream customers” and “major 
markets.” 
1. 9/11: Disruptive Innovation 
Using the 9/11 attacks as a prime example of “the few,” Nieto-Gomez 
concludes: “It is no longer true that technological innovation requires a heavy 
investment to manipulate nature and produce a result capable of having an 
impact in the real world…”302 Whereas he attributes this to recombination of 
incremental technologies—stopping short of naming the attacks as disruptive in 
nature,303 military theorist, Navy Captain Terry C. Pierce calls 9/11 a “classic 
disruptive innovation”: “The terrorists took existing technology that we invented—
airliners—and turned them into bombs. Terrorists are using other technologies 
we invented—the Internet, mobile phones, instant messaging—that have global 
reach. But they are using them in much different ways than we anticipated.”304 
Strategist and academic John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini 
identified this trend several years earlier, and prior to 9/11: 
Middle Eastern terrorist groups provide examples of information 
technology being used for a wide variety of purposes. As discussed 
below, there is some evidence to support the claim that the most 
active groups—and therefore the most decentralized groups—have 
embraced information technology to coordinate activities and 
disseminate propaganda and ideology. At the same time, the 
301 Nieto-Gomez, “The Power of ‘the Few,’” 5. 
302 Ibid., 6. 
303 Other terror attacks, such as the 2005 London and 2004 Madrid bombings, are explicitly 
deemed “not disruptive in nature.” 
304 Terry C. Pierce, “Rethinking Innovation: Disruptive Technology and Strategic Response,” 
Strategic Insights IV, no. 4 (April 2005). 
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technological assets and know-how gained by terrorist groups as 
they seek to form into multi-organizational networks can be used for 
offensive purposes—an Internet connection can be used for both 
coordination and disruption. The anecdotes provided here are 
consistent with the rise in the Middle East of what has been termed 
techno-terrorism, or the use by terrorists of satellite 
communications, e-mail, and the World Wide Web. 
Arab Afghans appear to have widely adopted information 
technology. According to reporters who visited bin Laden’s 
headquarters in a remote mountainous area of Afghanistan, the 
terrorist financier has computers, communications equipment, and 
a large number of disks for data storage. Egyptian “Afghan” 
computer experts are said to have helped devised a communication 
network that relies on the World Wide Web, e-mail, and electronic 
bulletin boards so that the extremists can exchange information 
without running a major risk of being intercepted by 
counterterrorism officials.305 
The consistency between this passage, and the views of Nieto-Gomez 
and Pierce underscores the central tenet that terrorists have embraced and 
adapted technology toward their own nefarious purposes, which not only leads to 
the proposition being put forth here—that some forms of modern terrorism are 
disruptive technologies—but bolstered the thesis of Nieto-Gomez’s paper.306 
“The power of the few” argues that: 
New technologies, especially disruptive technologies, come with 
new recombining potential. Because “the few” have better 
adaptivity than “the many,” small groups can take advantage of 
unforeseen consequences of the new altered environment more 
rapidly than authorities can identify a new potential threat and react 
to it.307  
305 John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and Information-
Age Terrorism,” in Countering the New Terrorism, ed. Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John 
Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini and Brian Michael Jenkins (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Project Air Force, 1999), 64–65. 
306 A second point of interest comes from noting the almost archaic terminology used in the 
1999 article. In many ways, this confirms the rapid pace of change that has taken place and the 
runaway train that technology is riding. 
307 Nieto-Gomez, “The Power of ‘the Few,’” 8. 
 102 
                                            
2. Complex Adaptive Systems 
It is important to recognize and understand the terror groups being 
discussed here in the context of complex adaptive systems, because this basis 
will offer strategy solutions that would otherwise be less salient toward random or 
chaotic nemeses, or perhaps rigidly organized groups, and therefore less 
applicable.308 For instance, “extreme responsiveness to small actions is one of 
the hallmarks of complex adaptive systems,”309 a point of consideration toward 
counter-strategies.  
Complexity science arose from chaos theory, when it became apparent 
over time that even complex systems might exhibit patterns of behavior.310 The 
benefit of recognizing complex systems, is that while they “do not allow precise 
prediction of specific events or outcomes of intervention, they do focus attention 
on the system, rather than simply the parts.”311 “Complex systems, under certain 
conditions, can be complex adaptive systems, self-organizing and perhaps 
moving to higher levels of system performance.”312  
It is difficult to otherwise define complex adaptive systems without using 
the component terms, such as: “a type of system—albeit a complex one—
capable of adaptation.”313 Davis and Jenkins offer contextual description: “The 
terrorist problem occurs in a rich context with many interacting entities and 
308 Anne-Marie Grisogono, “What do Natural Complex Adaptive Systems Teach us About 
Creating a Robustly Adaptive Force?” Presented at the 9th International Command and Control 
Research and Technology Symposium, Defence Science and Technology Organisation, South 
Australia, 2009. 
309 Judith E. Innes and David E. Booher, Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to 
Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy (London, UK: Routledge, 2010), Kindle edition, 184. 
310 Innes and Booher, Planning with Complexity. 
311 Ibid., 188. 
312 Innes and Booher, Planning with Complexity. 
313 Dale E. Lichtblau et al., “Analyzing Adversaries as Complex Adaptive Systems,” Institute 
for Defense Analysis, 2006, 12.  
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processes. Some aspects of the system are hierarchical; others are distributed; 
still others are networked. Terrorist systems adapt over time.”314  
Knopf explains that “thinking of al Qaeda as a system opens the door to 
deterrence by punishment.”315 Using the principal of indirect deterrence, “not 
aimed at attackers themselves, but at third parties whose actions could affect the 
likelihood that a potential attacker can or will carry out and attack,”316 the system 
provides solutions despite its complexity. 
B. COUNTER-STRATEGIES FOR SYSTEMS 
If, as Nieto-Gomez posits, technological innovation offers “the few” 
unprecedented opportunity at disruption, and “the few” are embedded into 
complex adaptive systems, then what counter-strategies may be offered? 
Donella Meadows concludes Thinking in Systems with what she hoped were 
‘systems wisdoms,’ beginning by exhorting the reader to watch first how a 
system behaves before disturbing it.317 “Starting with the behavior of the system 
directs one’s thoughts to dynamic, not static, analysis—not only to ‘What’s 
wrong?’ but also to ‘How did we get there.’”318 Adding to this point, Nieto-Gomez 
cautions, “…the homeland security environment should be understood as a 
chaotic system where long term planning is very difficult and forecasting is in 
reality impossible.”319  
Traditionally, policy formulation is seen as a linear process. “It is an 
input/output system, where we can examine each of the inputs and predict the 
impact on the system.”320 But viewed through the lens of complexity science, we 
314 Davis and Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism, 13. 
315 Knopf, “The Forth Wave in Deterrence Research,” 11. 
316 Ibid. 
317 Donella Meadows, Thinking in Systems (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green 
Publishing, 2008), Kindle edition. 
318 Ibid. 
319 Nieto-Gomez, “The Power of ‘the Few,’” 3. 
320 Innes and Booher, Planning with Complexity, 187. 
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are able to distinguish that “trying to describe the current state of the homeland 
security environment is a flawed approach to developing a strategy, mainly 
because the current state is just an instant in the evolution of this complex and 
randomized system.”321 
For Nieto-Gomez, although the “‘systemic mission’ of neutralizing 
incremental threats seems to be fulfilled in an acceptable way by the current 
homeland security institutional model,” the wicked threat “posed by the 
recombining of disruptive technologies” looms.322 The prescription for this, at the 
risk of oversimplifying, is fighting fire with fire. That is, “homeland security 
institutions addressing the ‘future shock mission’ have to be able to be proactive 
and become disruptive agents themselves.”323  
This is a departure from previous recommended strategies, such as by 
Arquilla and others, prior to 9/11: 
The key task for counterterrorism, then, is the identification of 
organizational and technological terrorist networks. Once such 
structures are identified, it may be possible to insert and 
disseminate false information, overload systems, misdirect 
message traffic, preclude access, and engage in other destructive 
and disruptive activities to hamper and prevent terrorist 
operations.324 
Years later, Pierce addressed the “netwar”325 or terrorist technological 
conundrum by offering:  
With the Internet and mobile phones and instant messaging, our 
enemies have moved up to yet another asymmetrical level, which 
you could call a virtual level of warfare. We can’t see it until it 
321 Nieto-Gomez, “The Power of ‘the Few,’” 4. 
322 Ibid., 13. 
323 Ibid., 14. 
324 Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism,” 81. 
325 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2001). 
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decloaks itself to send a message or to attack…should be focusing 
(on) developing precipitating technologies.326 
And one conclusion of a Rand study, contemporary to “the few,” on the 
exchange of technology among terror groups was, “…the U.S. government 
should disrupt innovation processes and reduce the potential for a successful 
exchange of technology” (between terrorist groups).327 The difference in 
strategies is clear. Nieto-Gomez reveals that this reactive approach to a rapidly 
changing and therefore chaotic environment is insufficient:  
Homeland security institutions are supposed to “connect” the 
proverbial dots to anticipate all the threats and vulnerability 
scenarios that have not yet happened, might never happen, but are 
morphing rapidly because of the complex nature of the recombining 
of technologies (old and new), and then patch security holes, 
before clandestine actors can exploit them.328 
C. MODERN TERRORISM AS DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
“Disruptive innovators take existing or new technologies and link them in a 
novel way or architecture or doctrine.”329 The masterminds of 9/11 were, 
therefore, disruptive innovators. Yet, although their goal of bringing down the 
towers was the same as one net effect of the 2001 attack, the 1993 World Trade 
Center co-conspirators were not. Is this because they failed in their mission or 
because they failed to innovate? It could rightly be argued that the truck bombing 
of a building, albeit a big one, is an incremental improvement on terrorist 
technology. It could also be properly delineated that the miscalculation in the 
effect of the explosion is irrelevant to the discussion of disruptiveness, and 
therefore it was not the success or failure of the attack.  
However, let us imagine the 9/11 hijackers failed to achieve direct hits on 
their targets, say they miscalculated cross winds and scored only glancing blows 
326 Pierce, “Rethinking Innovation.” 
327 Kim Cragin et al., Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of 
New Technologies (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Homeland Security, 2007), xvi.  
328 Nieto-Gomez, “The Power of ‘the Few,’” 10. 
329 Pierce, “Rethinking Innovation.” 
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on the towers and came in too high or low on the Pentagon, netting four crashed 
airliners, but little other structural damage. Disruption? Probably. Moreover, the 
reason is that the tsunami of change would have still occurred to a large extent. It 
may also be argued, then, that had World Trade Center bombing plan worked as 
desired, the world would have changed on February 26, 1993, instead of 
September 11, 2001.330 That being the case, the technological innovation rests 
at least as much on the parameters of terror attacks as it does on the specifics of 
technology employed. 
Thus, while it may be that the majority of terror attacks fall under the 
umbrella of incremental innovations—a suicide bomber in a crowd, train and 
plane bombings, kidnappings and assassinations331—the potential evidenced by 
modern radical Islamic terrorism—Beslan, 9/11, Mumbai—constitutes disruptive 
technology of itself, and regardless of technological specifics of techniques. In 
other words, it is the large “t” technology rather than small “t” that makes this so. 
Explosives remotely controlled by cell phone on a plane—incremental; the same 
explosives sewn inside a living person—disruptive. Assassinations of political 
figures, military personnel, or a particular religious or ethnic group—incremental. 
Assassinations of children taken hostage in a school—disruptive. 
The common denominator for modern terrorism as disruptive technology 
is radical Islamic terror—as evidenced in the examples above. Jenkins traces the 
genesis of “contemporary” terrorism to the late 60s and early 70s, declaring, 
“Terrorist tactics have a long history, but contemporary international terrorism is a 
relatively recent phenomenon.”332 One of the factors that differentiates the 
modern, al Qaeda brand of terrorism from this broader era, has to do with what 
330 See Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez discussion of “uchronia,” Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez, “Preventing 
the Next 9/10: The Homeland Security Challenges of Technological Evolution and Convergence 
in the Next Ten Years,” Homeland Security Affairs Journal 7, no. 2 (September 2011). 
331 Nieto-Gomez, “The Power of ‘the Few.’” 
332 Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation, 7. 
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caused Jenkins to revise “terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of 
people dead” to an and statement.333  
The technology harnessed to perpetrate 9/11 was not new at that time.334 
Nor was suicide terrorism. It was the recombination of technologies that made it 
noteworthy. It was the willingness of 19 individuals to end their lives in concert 
that changed the parameters of potential. What were unimaginable potentials 
before have become possibilities. “Disruptive technologies bring to a market a 
very different value proposition than had been available previously.”335 
We can further test the hypothesis of this view by examining some known 
features of disruptive technologies (though the relative size of the sample leaves 
only a cursory opportunity): 
• Innovations that result in worse product performance (at least in the 
near-term)  
For terror attacks, this could be read as failed (or partially failed) plots: 
World Trade Center toppling, ’93 vs. ’01; Underwear bomber; printer cartridge 
bombing  
• Typically cheaper, simpler, smaller, and, frequently more 
convenient to use  
For terror attacks, consider smaller cells/lone wolves, and the attempted 
exploitation of the “cracks” in the system as opposed to more complex 
innovations.336 Using the 2008 Mumbai siege as example, old/simple (guns, 
ieds, fire) and new/tech (cell phones, social media) were recombined in a way 
that was “more convenient” to exploit cracks in they security by small teams of 
attackers. 
333 Brian Michael Jenkins, “The New Age of Terrorism,” in The McGraw-Hill Homeland 
Security Handbook, ed. David G. Kamien (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 119, http://www. 
rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1215.html.  
334 Nieto-Gomez, “Preventing the Next 9/10,”  
335 Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma, 24. 
336 One issue of Inspire online jihadist magazine featured a “cover story” that bragged of the 
inexpensiveness of the printer cartridge plot ($4,200). 
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D. STRATEGIZING BEYOND TECHNOLOGY 
The problems posed by technological improvement and innovation by 
terrorists beget technological solutions, innovative or otherwise. Bruce Hoffman 
wrote in 1999, “A key factor contributing to terrorism’s rising lethality is the ease 
of terrorist adaptations across the technological spectrum.”337 Intelligent and 
committed people of the homeland security enterprise, such as Captain Terry C. 
Pierce, seek to combat the threat with “precision technology” that may need to be 
“disguised” to stay ahead.338 Cragin and others determined several modes to 
disrupt innovation among terror groups, including the targeting of familiar 
approaches, such as denial of safe havens, interruption of funding and 
elimination of key personnel.339  
Approaches, such as these have been working reasonably well over the 
past decade, in securing the homeland from attacks. In an incrementally 
implemented chess match, application of vast resources may win the day. 
However, Christensen has demonstrated and we have seen that when facing 
asymmetrical market competitors: “They give customers more than they need or 
ultimately are willing to pay for. And more importantly, it means that disruptive 
technologies that may underperform today, relative to what users in the market 
demand, may be fully performance-competitive in that same market 
tomorrow.”340 In addition, trying to outspend “the few” is not the solution.  
The 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) seeks a path, 
pressing: “We must seek to foster a rich and wide-ranging capacity to identify 
and think through complex and unfamiliar problems and to formulate effective 
and inventive solutions spanning many difficult and varied operational 
contexts.”341 Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez answers this challenge with the solution of a 
337 Hoffman, “Terrorism Trends and Prospects,” 28. 
338 Pierce, “Rethinking Innovation.” 
339 Cragin et al., Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth. 
340 Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma, 25. 
341 Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 75. 
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Homeland Security version of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA), freed from constraints and disrupting the disruptors.342 
Yet, if we accept the correlations between terror groups and the homeland 
security enterprise as organizations competing for product profitability—effective 
acts of terror versus safety and serenity—then offering modern forms of terrorism 
as disruptive technologies in comparison to the Homeland Security approach to 
business becomes problematic: 
By and large, a disruptive technology is initially embraced by the 
least profitable customers in a market. Hence, most companies with 
a practiced discipline of listening to their best customers and 
identifying new products that promise greater profitability and 
growth are rarely able to build a case for investing in disruptive 
technologies until it is too late.343 
If the “least profitable customers” represent those marginalized individuals 
who may be led up the staircase toward terrorism by the appeal of the disruptive 
technology, and on the other hand, the homeland security enterprise continues 
on a path influenced by its “best customers,” than what might the “too late” be? 
To take it one step further, if the United States is representative of a solid, 
powerful corporation, threatened by the disruptive innovation of “the few,” then 
solving problems the way good companies do might be counterproductive. We 
know this from one of the central lessons in Christensen’s study of the effects of 
disruptive technologies on top companies. Because his findings proved that 
doing all the right things, listening to customers and share-holders, employing 
sound strategies, does not work: “…good management was the most powerful 
reason they failed to stay atop their industries.”344 
342 Nieto-Gomez, “The Power of ‘the Few.’” 
343 Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma, 28. 
344 Ibid., 18. 
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1. A Deterrence Strategy 
Modern radical Islamic terrorist ideology, goals, strategies, and tactics 
intersect to form what constitutes disruptive technology. Application of a 
comprehensive, imaginative, and tailored deterrence policy is an efficient and 
effective way to counter this ongoing threat. The tailored deterrence does not 
seek to target individuals, but parts of a known system. “The distributed nature of 
transnational terrorist networks complicates the conduct of an effective 
deterrence campaign, but it also offers additional opportunities.”345 Knopf offers 
that in thinking of al Qaeda as a system, the opportunity for deterrence comes in 
targeting the “supporters and enablers of terrorism.”346 
The approach to instituting such strategy should be based on free input 
from a variety of disciplines, formed to be flexible or “living.” Knowledge and 
lessons learned from top scholars in the field, as well as military strategists and 
intelligence specialists should be highly sourced; however, the bulk of the minds 
in the project should be from outside these specialties, to encourage innovation. 
Just about everyone and anyone in the political arena and battle-scarred 
homeland security enterprise, as well as those with competing interests (in the 
form of special interests/lobbyists) might be opposed to this track. Some 
pushback might come from the Islamic world also. This might be instructive in 
terms of attention to details, as well as determining if the course is the right 
one.347 A pendulum swing to state-level conflicts, a substantial shift to terrorism 
motivated by substantially different ideologies, or the petering out of the radical 
Islamic threat are some wildcards that might affect this strategy. 
345 Chilton and Weaver, “Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,” 37. 
346 Knopf, “The Fourth Wave of Deterrence Research,” 10. 
347 Loud cries from known Islamic fundamentalists associated with terrorists might be a 
positive sign. 
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E. DETERRENCE AS INNOVATION 
We have seen how simply recombining existing technologies can create 
conditions so impactful that the resulting innovation becomes disruptive 
technology. In fact, the technology recombined in September 2001, all existed in 
1973, though the “‘9/11 idea’ did not.”348 Thus, while technology innovation is 
often central to solving a problem like terrorism, innovation does not rest 
completely on higher and higher technology. Recombining deterrence policy in 
new ways might constitute an innovation, and if successfully implemented, 
disrupt the disruptive technology that is modern terrorism. 
The rub comes from implementation of untested ideas into a complex 
adaptive system. Judith Innes explains, “…evocative ideas about systems are 
difficult to introduce into policy making because Newtonian physics has had such 
a deep impact on our way of thinking about the world.”349 
Given this, we may ask if we mean what we say. The QHSR was 
specifically “designed to serve as a catalyst to spur the continued evolution and 
maturation of our Nation’s homeland security enterprise”350 Strategic deterrence 
was re-introduced and accepted as a viable component of homeland security 
policy years earlier. Yet, rather than represent an “evolution” and “maturation,” it 
has scarcely moved past a notion.  
The incremental evolution of the homeland security environment over the 
past several years has taken us to this point. However, “the key to strategic 
management…is to sustain stability or at least adaptable strategic change most 
of the time, but periodically to recognize the need for transformation and be able 
to manage that disruptive process without destroying the organization.351 
348 Nieto-Gomez, “Preventing the Next 9/10,” 3. 
349 Innes and Booher, Planning with Complexity, 186. 
350 Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 77. 
351 Henry Mintzberg, Bruce Ahlstrand, and Joseph Lampel, Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour 
Through the Wilds of Strategic Management (New York, NY: Free Press, 1998), Kindle edition. 
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 All indications are that a transformation is in order. “In the years ahead, the 
world will be filled with breathtaking technological changes, social advances, and 
an accelerating flow of ideas, goods, and people around the world. The 
advancements and global interactions will enrich and improve our lives, but they 
may also be exploited by, or may contribute to violent extremism.”352  
352 Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 77. 
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VI. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. FINDINGS 
The central argument of this research paper is that deterrence has been 
proven to be an effective security strategy, abandoned in post-9/11 policy, but 
worthy of reevaluation. The 2002 National Security Strategy states, “Traditional 
concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed 
tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called 
soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is 
statelessness.” Ten years later, this statement still rings true. However, what is 
offered in this thesis is something other than “traditional” deterrence, which 
specifically employs the conditions described in this statement toward the 
formation of “asymmetric” concepts of deterrence.  
The United States was conducting some level of deterrence by denial 
even before 9/11, as we have seen that target hardening, intelligence gathering 
and sharing and other indirect steps make successful attacks more difficult to 
conduct. Despite the references to the abandonment of deterrence in the face of 
the asymmetrical threat that confronts us in the new century, a surprising amount 
of research, planning, and writing has gone into this very idea in the past decade. 
The importance of the research arises from the costly war against 
terrorism as it has been conducted since 2001, which, furthermore, appears to 
have no end in sight. The costs have come in expenditures, casualties, and 
national stature. Deterrence may offer something more sustainable, safe, and 
sanitary. 
What has been offered in this paper in review is that deterrence can be 
tailored, which comes from an understanding of the adversary, and that with 
regard to violent Islamic extremism, we know the adversary very well based on 
over a decade of national focus and dramatically increased funding toward that 
end. To this understanding was added an inquiry into relatable conflicts and 
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crimes, and a deeper review of the aspects of deterrence. Taken together, these 
formed the data that was applied to an analysis. 
Using some foundational parameters, including the framework provided by 
Davis and Jenkins a decade ago, an analysis was conducted on tailored 
deterrence. Based on the various options, it was determined that some form of 
deterrence would present applicable CT choices for the various components of 
the radical Islamic terror systems. Additionally, the incorporation of the special 
cases of suicide bombers and lone wolves completed the threat portrait. 
Generally, those strategies comprising the middle part of the deterrence 
spectrum—denial, disruption, and threaten—were shown to be effective and 
most practical, economical, and palatable.  
Yet something more seems necessary to overcome the inertia with regard 
to instituting deterrence policy. What is needed is innovation in using all that is 
known of the adversary and the practice of deterrence. Chapter V offered one 
course by examining the problem in the context of systems. It was posited that if 
we view Islamic terror groups as complex adaptive systems, and the terror 
strategies and acts as disruptive technologies, then we may be able to formulate 
counter-strategies more suited to the threat. 
The suggestion is that tailored deterrence is an appropriate counter, if we 
look at the systems view as an opportunity. The stealthness and innovation of the 
conduct of terror merits an opposing imaginative and disruptive response. The 
hope is that from this perspective, implementation of tailored deterrence might be 
realized in actual policy, rather than in the realm of suggestive direction. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
• Support for use of deterrence strategy to counter the terrorist threat 
has strengthened over the last decade. 
Growing support was most evident in the review of the literature, in 
particular, national security reviews and strategies. However, actual policy 
implementation has been all but nil. 
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• Terrorism deterrence requires careful target analysis and a tailored 
application. 
For the same reasons that deterrence was once dismissed as a counter-
terror strategy, the work comes in the target tailoring. This may prove to be a 
stumbling block to implementation. 
• Deterrence policy should be formulated with reverence for 
American values. 
This point was widely stated among authors and thinkers and universally 
agreed upon. This course should be overtly stated and continuously transparent. 
• The United States must earn and maintain a strong reputation for 
credibility as it is an indispensable component of deterrence. 
Say what you mean and mean what you say. Anything less will be 
exploited by terrorist leaders and recruiters. 
• The cost of failure may be measured in credibility rather than 
dollars 
The policy risk may be felt more in national reputation than associated 
costs in kinetic operations. This may be politically less appetizing. 
• The efficacy of deterrence strategy may be difficult to analyze 
It is difficult to measure if a threat is effective. Often, little evidence is 
available other than the lack of attack(s), which is almost impossible to pinpoint 
to a cause. 
• Policy makers may avoid the tool of deterrence because it is 
difficult to test. 
Policy makers are politicians who seek measurable results that they can 
point to. Interest may also swing based on a low-risk downside, however.  
• Deterrence should be a prominent part of U.S. policy 
Emphasis on both “prominent” and “part.” 
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C. IMPLEMENTATION 
One way to implement deterrence strategy might be to evolve or recast 
some of the Homeland Security information sharing initiatives toward 
constructing and disseminating specifics. These programs cover the spectrum of 
agencies, which would serve to offer a breadth of ideas, experiences, and 
information conduits. Information sharing has probably already pinnacled in many 
segments and it has been offered that connecting dots in a complex adaptive 
environment is less valuable than once thought.353 If earnestly instituted, 
deterrence policy can offer a solution to the growing menace of “the few” in a 
sustainable way. 
Having recognized time and again the innovative savvy of our terrorist 
adversaries, it is time that the U.S. government determines to fight fire with fire. 
Playing the game better is a solution to overcoming disruptive innovators. 
“Combinatorial evolution of technology does not have to favor the illicit 
appropriator. This randomized environment created by the accelerated pace of 
technology cycles will favor those who can produce more ideas, and ride the 
wave of uncertainty instead of opposing it.”354  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Our primary research question—how can the United States make better 
use of deterrence strategies in ongoing CT efforts?—can begin to be addressed 
in the following ways: 
(1) Promote Wise Use of Deterrence. Deterrence should be an 
explicitly and prominently stated objective of national strategies, in keeping with 
the stated hypothesis—deterrence strategy as an element of counterterrorism 
policy should be as specific and overt as possible/practical in order to be 
effective—and as supported by the findings here. Furthermore, the U.S. 
353 Nieto-Gomez, “The Power of ‘the Few.’” 
354 Nieto-Gomez, “Preventing the Next 9/10,” 4. 
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government and homeland security enterprise must find creative and credible 
ways to convey deterrents to the parts of the terrorist organizations that we seek 
to influence. Knopf’s offered, “One especially innovative suggestion that merits 
follow-up research involves using information or discourse as a source of 
influence,” in summary of his review of the “Fourth Wave of Terrorism 
Research.”355 The increasing use and success of social media by terror groups 
underscores this point. The United States should commit assets to these tasks. 
(2) Seek Carrot Opportunities. As a next step to the implementation of 
deterrence by denial, disruption, and threat, we should seek avenues for 
encouraging restraint/low end of scale possibilities. The goal should be a gradual 
transition to positive inducements from the punishment strategy to which we are 
accustomed. START’s Laura Dugan and her associate Erica Chenoweth have 
found their research, “suggests that rewarding good behavior, as opposed to 
punishing the bad, could be an effective form of counterterrorism.”356 Although 
they term this “beyond deterrence,” it could be viewed toward the low end of the 
spectrum and should be further exploited toward overall policy.357 
(3) Adapt Additional Terror Applications. Once enacted, measured, and 
evaluated, innovative deterrence policy should be adapted and tailored toward all 
terrorism and other asymmetric threats faced by the United States, including right 
wing, eco-terrorism, and other non-radical Islamic transnational threats. 
355 Knopf, “The Forth Wave in Deterrence Research,” 2–3. 
356 Laura Dugan, “Discussion Point: Thinking Beyond Deterrence,” START, April 29, 2013, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/news/discussion-point-thinking-beyond-deterrence. 
357 Laura Dugan and Erica Chenoweth, “Moving Beyond Deterrence: The Effectiveness of 
Raising the Expected Utility of Abstaining from Terrorism in Israel,” American Sociological Review 
77, no. 4 (August 2012): 597–624, http://asr.sagepub.com/content/77/4/597.abstract. 
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